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Through	   the	   recruitment	   of	   judges	   –	   their	   selection	   and	   subsequent	   appointment	   –	  
powerful	   actors	   control	  who	   enters	   the	   judicial	   ranks	   and	   under	  what	   circumstances.	   In	  
this	  paper	  I	  address	  how	  are	  European	  judges	  recruited	  using	  examples	  from	  ten	  European	  
countries,	  while	  paying	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judicial	  self-­‐government	  in	  these	  
processes.	  Indeed,	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  recruitment	  processes	  across	  Europe.	  In	  
some	   countries,	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   judicial	   recruitment	   is	   played	   by	   judicial	   schools;	  
elsewhere	   crucial	   powers	   belong	   to	   judicial	   councils	   and/or	   other	   bodies	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐
government;	   in	   the	   UK	   or	   Ireland	   some	   of	   these	   powers	   were	   vested	   in	   the	   hands	   of	  
specialized	  bodies;	  whereas	  in	  other	  countries	  the	  process	  remains	  less	  formal	  with	  crucial	  
powers	   resting	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   court	   presidents.	   Despite	   these	   differences,	   I	   choose	   to	  
emphasize	   similarities	   recruitment	   processes	   share.	   They	   operate	   as	   funnels	   where	   the	  
pool	   of	   candidates	   gradually	   decreases	  until	   only	  one	   (or	   few)	   remains	   and	   is	   eventually	  
appointed.	   In	  order	  to	  assume	  judicial	  office	  one	  usually	  must	   (a)	  meet	  eligibility	  criteria,	  
(b)	  get	  on	  selector’s	  radar	  to	  be	  actively	  considered	  for	  the	  position,	  (c)	  get	  shortlisted	  for	  
the	   position,	   (d)	   get	   selected,	   and	   (e)	   eventually	   appointed.	   Dividing	   the	   recruitment	  
process	  into	  these	  stages,	  while	  paying	  attention	  to	  motivations	  of	  all	  involved	  actors,	  can	  
help	  deepen	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  judicial	  recruitment	  actually	  works	  and	  how	  formal	  
and	  informal	  rules	  together	  shape	  the	  composition	  of	  judiciaries.	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A.	  Introduction	  
	  
Through	   the	   recruitment	   of	   judges	   –	   their	   selection	   and	   subsequent	   appointment	   –	  
powerful	   actors	   control	   who	   enters	   the	   judicial	   ranks	   and	   under	   what	   circumstances.	   A	  
vast	   literature	   has	   been	   dedicated	   to	   this	   topic,	   mainly	   in	   common	   law	   countries,1	  
Constitutional	  courts	  around	  the	  world,2	  or	  international	  courts.3	  Scholarly	  attention4	  paid	  
to	   judicial	   recruitment	   in	   ordinary	   judiciaries	   has	  mainly	   focused	   on	   the	   procedures	   and	  
formal	   bodies	   involved	   in	   the	   process.5	   Nevertheless,	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   process	  
actually	  translates	  into	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  judiciary	  certainly	  has	  consequences	  for	  the	  
expertise	   and	   quality	   of	   the	   bench,6	   while	   it	   also	   affects	   such	   issues	   as	   diversity	   and	  
representativeness	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   which	   are	   important	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  
representative	   democracy.7	   In	   addition,	   as	   recruitment	   establishes	   a	   link	   between	   the	  
selector	  and	  the	  judge,	  it	  can	  be	  linked	  with	  the	  independence	  of	  individual	  judges	  as	  well	  
as	  judiciaries	  in	  collective	  terms.8	  Once	  the	  judges	  are	  appointed,	  their	  performance	  affects	  
public	   attitudes	   towards	   judicial	   institutions,	   as	  well	   as	   political	   institutions	   in	   a	   broader	  
                                            
1	  E.g.	  Judith	  Resnik,	  Judicial	  Selection	  and	  Democratic	  Theory:	  Demand,	  Supply,	  and	  Life	  Tenure,	  26	  CARDOZO	  L.R.	  
597	  (2015);	  Lee	  Epstein	  &	  Jack	  Knight	  &	  Olga	  Shevtsova,	  Comparing	  Judicial	  Selection	  Systems,	  10	  WILLIAM	  &	  MARY	  
7	   (2007);	   Kate	  Malleson,	   Rethinking	   the	  Merit	   Principle	   in	   Judicial	   Selection,	   33	   JOURNAL	   OF	   LAW	   &	   SOCIETY	   126	  
(2006);	  JAN	  VAN	  ZYL	  SMIT,	  THE	  APPOINTMENT,	  TENURE	  AND	  REMOVAL	  OF	  JUDGES	  UNDER	  COMMONWEALTH	  PRINCIPLES	  (2015);	  
DEBATING	  JUDICIAL	  APPOINTMENTS	  IN	  THE	  AGE	  OF	  DIVERSITY	  (Graham	  Gee	  &	  Erika	  Rackley	  eds.,	  2018).	  
2	   E.g.	   Charles	  Manga	   Fombad,	  Appointment	   of	   constitutional	   adjudicators	   in	   Africa:	   some	   perspectives	   on	   how	  
different	   systems	  yield	   similar	  outcomes,	  46	  THE	   JOURNAL	  OF	  LEGAL	  PLURALISM	  AND	  UNOFFICIAL	   LAW	  249	   (2014);	  TOM	  
GINSBURG,	  JUDICIAL	  REVIEW	  IN	  NEW	  DEMOCRACIES:	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  COURTS	  IN	  ASIAN	  CASES	  (2003);	  RULE	  BY	  LAW:	  THE	  POLITICS	  
OF	  COURTS	  IN	  AUTHORITARIAN	  REGIMES	  (Tom	  Ginsburg	  &	  Tamir	  Moustafa	  eds.,	  2008).	  
3	   Erik	  Voeten,	  The	  Politics	   of	   International	   Judicial	  Appointments:	   Evidence	   from	   the	   European	  Court	   of	  Human	  
Rights,	  61	  INTERNATIONAL	  ORGANIZATION	  669	  (2007);	  MICHAL	  BOBEK,	  SELECTING	  EUROPE’S	  JUDGES:	  A	  CRITICAL	  REVIEW	  OF	  THE	  
APPOINTMENT	  PROCEDURES	  TO	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  COURTS	  (OUP	  2015).	  
4	   It	  needs	   to	  be	  admitted	   that	   in	  my	   research	   I	  am	   limited	   to	   the	   literature	  written	   in	  English,	  Slovak	  or	  Czech,	  
hence	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  research	  written	  in	  other	  languages	  is	  omitted.	  
5	  E.g.	  Carlo	  Guarnieri,	  Appointment	  and	  career	  of	  judges	  in	  continental	  Europe:	  the	  rise	  of	  judicial	  self-­‐government,	  
24	   LEGAL	   STUDIES	   169	   (2004);	   JOHN	   BELL,	   JUDICIARIES	   WITHIN	   EUROPE.	   A	   COMPARATIVE	   REVIEW	   (2006);	   RECRUITMENT,	  
PROFESSIONAL	  EVALUATION	  AND	  CAREER	  OF	  JUDGES	  AND	  PROSECUTORS	  IN	  EUROPE	  (Giuseppe	  Di	  Federico	  ed.,	  2005);	  or	  some	  
chapters	  in	  APPOINTING	  JUDGES	  IN	  AN	  AGE	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  POWER	  (Kate	  Malleson	  &	  Peter	  H.	  Russell	  eds.,	  2006).	  
6	  E.g.	  Michael	  R.	  Dimino,	  The	  Futile	  Quest	  for	  a	  System	  of	  Judicial	  “Merit”	  Selection,	  67	  ALBANY	  L.R.	  803	  (2004).	  
7	  E.g.	  Bell,	  supra	  note	  5,	  regularly	  addresses	  the	  representation	  of	  women;	  Malleson,	  supra	  note	  1;	  Kate	  Malleson,	  
The	   Disruptive	   Potential	   of	   Ceiling	   Quotas	   in	   Addressing	   the	   Over-­‐Representation	   in	   the	   Judiciary,	   in	   DEBATING	  
JUDICIAL	  APPOINTMENTS	  IN	  THE	  AGE	  OF	  DIVERSITY	  259	  (Graham	  Gee	  &	  Erika	  Rackley	  eds.,	  2018);	  Erika	  Rackley,	  Women,	  
Judging	  and	  the	  judiciary:	  from	  difference	  to	  diversity	  (2013);	  and	  even	  CEPEJ	  reports	  address	  the	  share	  of	  women	  
in	   European	   judiciaries,	   see	   for	   instance:	   Council	   of	   Europe,	  European	  Commission	   for	   the	   Efficiency	   of	   Justice,	  
European	  judicial	  systems:	  Efficiency	  and	  quality	  of	  justice	  97-­‐101	  (2016).	  
8	   Charles	  G.	  Geyh,	  The	   Endless	   Judicial	   Selection	  Debate	   and	  Why	   It	  Matters	   for	   Judicial	   Independence,	   21	   THE	  
GEORGETOWN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LEGAL	  ETHICS	  1259	  (2008).	  
2018	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  European	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sense,9	   the	   state	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law,10	   and	   can	   be	   even	   connected	   to	   economic	  
performance.11	  
	  
Over	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  decades,	  the	  world	  has	  observed	  an	  undeniable	  increase	  of	  judicial	  
power	  and	  a	  growing	   involvement	  of	   judges	   in	  the	  administration	  of	   judiciaries.12	   Judicial	  
recruitment	  was	  one	  of	  the	  central	   issues	   in	  the	  debates	  surrounding	   it.	   In	  Europe,	  these	  
changes	  were	  supported	  and	  encouraged	  by	  a	  variety	  of	   international	  documents,	  mainly	  
backed	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe.13	  As	  early	  as	  in	  the	  1980s,	  
the	  ECtHR	  case	   law	  developed	  criteria	   for	   the	  assessment	  of	   independence	  of	  a	   tribunal;	  
the	  manner	   through	  which	  members	   of	   such	   a	   body	   are	   appointed	  was	   one	   of	   them.14	  
Judgments	  remained	  rather	  vague	  as	  to	  what	  a	  proper	  mechanism	  is	  for	  appointment	  that	  
would	   meet	   these	   criteria,	   therefore	   a	   variety	   of	   ‘soft	   law’	   documents	   provided	   more	  
guidance	   in	   the	   following	  years.15	  As	   these	  recommendations	  were	  usually	  created	  by	  an	  
international	  network	  of	   judges,	  perhaps	   ‘it	   is	  not	  surprising	  that	  [they]	  are	  based	  on	  the	  
                                            
9	  E.g.	  Marc	  Bühlmann	  &	  Ruth	  Kunz,	  Confidence	   in	  the	  Judiciary:	  Comparing	  the	  Independence	  and	  Legitimacy	  of	  
Judicial	   Systems,	   34	  WEST	   EUROPEAN	   POLITICS	   317	   (2011);	   or	   for	   an	   overview	   see	  Marína	   Urbániková	  &	   Katarína	  
Šipulová,	  The	  Failed	  Expectations:	  Does	  the	  Establishment	  of	   Judicial	  Councils	  Enhance	  Confidence	   in	  Courts?	   (in	  
this	  special	  issue).	  
10	  E.g.	  Maria	  Popova,	  POLITICIZED	  JUSTICE	  IN	  EMERGING	  DEMOCRACIES:	  A	  STUDY	  OF	  COURTS	  IN	  RUSSIA	  AND	  UKRAINE	  (2012).	  
11	  E.g.	  Mathieu	  Chemin,	  Do	  judiciaries	  matter	   for	  development?	  Evidence	  from	  India,	  37	  JOURNAL	  OF	  COMPARATIVE	  
ECONOMICS	   230	   (2009);	   Stefan	   Voigt,	   Jerg	   Gutmann	   &	   Lars	   Feld,	   Economic	   growth	   and	   judicial	   independence,	  
a	  dozen	   years	   on:	   Cross-­‐country	   evidence	   using	   an	   updated	   Set	   of	   indicators,	   38	   EUROPEAN	   JOURNAL	   OF	   POLITICAL	  
ECONOMY	   197	   (2015);	   or	   J.	   Anthony	   Cookson,	   Economic	   Consequences	   of	   Judicial	   Institutions:	   Evidence	   from	   a	  
Natural	  Experiment	  (2014),	  available	  at:	  https://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/isnie2014/cookson.pdf.	  
12	  See	  Nuno	  Garoupa	  &	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  Guarding	  the	  Guardians:	  Judicial	  Councils	  and	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  57	  
THE	   AMERICAN	   JOURNAL	   OF	   COMPARATIVE	   LAW	   103	   (2009)	   at	   123;	   Daniel	   Smilov,	   EU	   Enlargement	   and	   the	  
Constitutional	  Principle	  of	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Wojciech	  Sadurski,	  Adam	  Czarnota	  &	  Martin	  Krygier,	  SPREADING	  
DEMOCRACY	  AND	  THE	  RULE	  OF	   LAW?	  THE	   IMPACT	  OF	  EU	  ENLARGEMENT	   FOR	   THE	  RULE	  OF	   LAW	  313	   (2006);	  or	  David	  Kosař,	  
Beyond	  Judicial	  Councils:	  Forms,	  Rationales	  and	  Impact	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Governance	  in	  Europe	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
13	   See	   Smilov,	   supra	   note	   12;	   Cristina	   E.	   Parau,	   The	   Drive	   for	   Judicial	   Supremacy,	   in	   JUDICIAL	   INDEPENDENCE	   IN	  
TRANSITION	   619	   (Anja	   Seibert-­‐Fohr	   ed.,	   2012);	   or	   David	   Kosař,	   PERILS	   OF	   JUDICIAL	   SELF-­‐GOVERNMENT	   IN	   TRANSITIONAL	  
SOCIETIES	  121-­‐135	  (2016).	  
14	   For	   an	   overview	   see	   Ann	   Power,	   Judicial	   Independence	   and	   the	   Democratic	   Process:	   Some	   Case	   Law	   of	   the	  
European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (International	  Bar	  Association	  Conference	  2012).	  See	  also:	  ECtHR,	  23	  June	  1981,	  
Le	  Compte,	  Van	  Leuven	  and	  De	  Meyere	  v.	  Belgium,	  no.	  6878/75;	  7238/75;	  ECtHR,	  28	  June	  1984,	  Campbell	  and	  Fell	  
v.	  The	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  7819/77;	  7878/77;	  ECtHR,	  22	  June	  1989,	  Lanbgorger	  v.	  Sweden,	  no.	  11179/84,	  §	  32.	  
15	   See	   Committee	   of	   Ministers	   of	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   Recommendation	   No.	   R	   (94)	   12	   on	   the	   Independence,	  
Efficiency	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Judges,	  particularly	  Principle	  I,	  Art.	  2,	  par.	  C;	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  European	  Charter	  on	  the	  
Statute	  for	  Judges,	  particularly	  Art.	  1.3.;	   International	  Association	  of	  Judges,	  The	  Universal	  Charter	  of	  the	  Judge,	  
particularly	  Art.	  9.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  ‘soft	  law’	  on	  EctHR	  case	  law	  affecting	  judicial	  reforms	  in	  Europe	  see	  
David	   Kosař,	  Nudging	   Domestic	   Judicial	   Reforms	   from	   Strasbourg:	   How	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	  
shapes	  domestic	  judicial	  design	  in	  13	  UTRECHT	  L.R.	  112	  (2017).	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belief	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   best	   served	   by	   judicial	   autonomy.’16	   There	   are	   two	   main	  
conclusions	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  these	  documents	  with	  regard	  to	  judicial	  recruitment.	  
First,	  they	  posit	  that	  the	  process	  of	  recruiting	  judges	  should	  be	  conducted	  by	  a	  body	  with	  
substantial	   judicial	   representation	  that	   is	   independent	  of	  political	  branches.	  Second,	   they	  
hold	  a	  belief	  that	  this	  should	  serve	  the	  idea	  of	  recruitment	  based	  on	  merit,	  hence	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  qualification,	  integrity,	  ability,	  and	  efficiency	  of	  candidates.	  	  
	  
Initially,	  these	  recommendations	  were	  meant	  to	  apply	  mainly	  to	  post-­‐communist	  countries	  
in	   need	   of	   reforming	   their	   judicial	   systems.	   The	   1994	   Recommendation	   adopted	   by	   the	  
Committee	   of	  Ministers	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   allowed	   for	   different	   arrangements,	   if	  
these	  tasks	  were	  traditionally	  conducted	  by	  the	  government	  leaving	  old	  democracies	  in	  the	  
clear.	   A	   later	   recommendation	   adopted	   in	   2010	   has	   not	   been	   as	   understanding.	   The	  
document	   prescribes	   that	   if	   decisions	   about	   judicial	   careers	   are	   carried	   out	   by	   political	  
authorities,	   these	   powers	   should	   be	   transferred	   to	   ‘an	   independent	   and	   competent	  
authority	  drawn	  in	  substantial	  part	  from	  the	  judiciary’,17	  which	  should	  be	  authorized	  to	  at	  
least	  make	  recommendations	  or	  express	  opinions	  that	  relevant	  authorities	  should	  follow.	  
This	  shift	  towards	  a	  greater	  involvement	  of	  judges	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  judicial	  careers	  
has	   several	   common	   themes.	   First,	   it	   is	   based	   on	   a	   distrust	   towards	   political	   elites,	  
conceiving	  insulation	  and	  de-­‐politicization	  of	  the	  judiciary	  as	  a	  solution.18	  Second,	  there	  is	  a	  
belief	  that	  decisions	  about	  careers	  –	  and	  recruitment	  of	  judges	  in	  particular	  –	  establishes	  a	  
connection	  between	  selectors	  and	  prospective	  judges,	  which	  motivates	  selectors	  to	  choose	  
candidates	  who	  would	  not	  act	  contradictorily	   to	   their	  preferences.19	  Third,	   it	   is	  based	  on	  
the	   conviction	   that	   judges	   are	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   less	   dangerous	   than	   those	   in	   other	  
branches,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  that	  judges	  are	  more	  capable	  of	  securing	  continuity	  than	  
changing	  governments	  or	  parliamentary	  majorities.20	  
	  
In	   this	   paper	   I	   address	   two	   interconnected	   questions.	   First,	   how	   are	   judges	   in	   European	  
countries	   recruited,	   and	   second,	   what	   is	   the	   role	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐government	   in	   these	  
processes	   given	   the	   rise	   of	   power	   of	   judges	   observable	   in	   recent	   decades?	   There	   is	   no	  
                                            
16	  Michal	  Bobek	  &	  David	  Kosař,	  Global	  Solutions,	  Local	  Damages:	  A	  Critical	  Study	  in	  Judicial	  Councils	  in	  Central	  and	  
Eastern	  Europe	  in	  15	  GERMAN	  L.J.	  1257	  (2014),	  at	  1262;	  Parau,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  646-­‐647.	  
17	   Committee	   of	   Ministers	   of	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   Recommendation	   CM/Rec(2010)12	   on	   Judges:	   independence,	  
efficiency	  and	  responsibilities,	  Art.	  47.	  
18	   E.g.	   Parau,	   supra	   note	   13,	   at	   621;	   or	   Franck	   Emmert,	   The	   Independence	   of	   Judges	   –	   A	  Concept	   Often	  
Misuderstood	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  3	  EUROPEAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LAW	  REFORM	  405	  (2001).	  
19	  Not	  necessarily	  would	  a	  selector	  be	  ever	  willing	  to	  utilize	  such	  capacity.	  For	  more	  on	  ‘willingness’	  and	  ‘capacity’	  
to	  pressure	  courts	  see	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  10.	  
20	  For	  the	  discussion	  on	  factors	  that	  play	  in	  favor	  of	  judges	  in	  this	  context	  see	  Alan	  Paterson,	  Power	  and	  Judicial	  
Appointment:	  Squaring	  the	  Impossible	  Circle	  in	  Gee	  &	  Rackley,	  supra	  note	  1,	  particularly	  at	  49	  et	  seq.	  In	  terms	  of	  
controlling	  access	  to	  a	  particular	  profession,	  judges	  are	  not	  that	  unique.	  See	  Keith	  M.	  MacDonald,	  The	  sociology	  of	  
professions	  (1995).	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doubt	   there	   are	   differences	   between	   these	   processes	   in	   different	   countries	   –	   from	   the	  
formal	   criteria	  one	  must	  meet	   to	  become	  a	   judge,	   to	   actors	  deciding	   about	  who	  gets	   to	  
enter	   the	   judicial	   ranks.	   However,	   I	   choose	   to	   emphasize	   similarities	   between	   these	  
processes.	   Judicial	   recruitment	   operates	   like	   a	   funnel	   where	   candidates	   are	   gradually	  
eliminated	  until	  only	  one	  –	  or	  a	  few	  –	  remain.	  To	  become	  a	  judge,	  candidates	  need	  to	  meet	  
certain	  eligibility	  criteria,	  they	  need	  to	  ‘get	  on	  the	  selectors’	  radar’;	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  a	  
position,	   they	   need	   to	  meet	   the	   selectors’	   expectations	   to	   be	   shortlisted	   and	   eventually	  
selected	   for	   the	   job;	   and	   finally,	   they	   need	   to	   assume	   the	   office	   through	   some	   formal	  
appointment	  procedure.21	  By	  highlighting	  similarities	   in	  the	  process	  of	  recruiting	   judges,	   I	  
aim	  to	  propose	  a	  framework	  that	  is	  applicable	  beyond	  the	  countries	  analyzed	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	   I	  argue	  that	  the	  recruitment	  process	   is	  –	  despite	  any	  merit-­‐oriented	  efforts	  –	  
far	   from	  a	  perfect	   competition.	   Everyone	   involved	  has	   specific	   interests	   and	  preferences	  
regarding	  who	  should	  become	  a	  judge,	  and	  this	  skews	  the	  process.	  Indeed,	  these	  interests	  
should	  not	  be	  necessarily	  perceived	  with	  a	  negative	  connotation,	  they	  may	  be	  absolutely	  
legitimate,	   even	   virtuous.	   Nevertheless,	   they	   shape	   the	   process	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	  
increases	   chances	   of	   some	   candidates	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   others	   –	   be	   it	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
gender,	   race,	  or	   any	  other	   characteristic.	  Contrary	   to	  belief	  entrenched	   in	   the	  numerous	  
international	  documents	  discussed	  earlier,	  I	  contend	  that	  judges	  are	  as	  fallible	  as	  any	  other	  
actor	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  recruiting	  new	  judges.	  As	  some	  research	  shows,	  their	  interests	  can	  
be	  aligned	  with	  the	  ruling	  elite;22	  they	  can	  have	  their	  own	  distinct	  interests	  stemming	  from	  
the	   bureaucratic	   nature	   of	   the	   job,23	   or	   from	   the	   genuine	   belief	   only	   they	   can	   properly	  
exercise	  this	  task.24	  	  
	  
In	   summary,	   in	   order	   to	   analyze	   judicial	   recruitment	   and	   its	   consequences	   we	   not	   only	  
need	   to	   identify	   the	  actors	   involved	   in	   the	  process,	  but	   also	   study	   their	  preferences	  and	  
pay	   attention	   to	   the	   stages	   of	   the	   process	   in	  which	   they	   shape	   the	   recruitment.	   As	   the	  
recruitment	   process	   operates	   like	   a	   funnel	   where	   candidates	   are	   gradually	   eliminated,	  
some	  attention	  needs	  to	  be	  paid	  particularly	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  type	  of	  candidates	  do	  
not	   have	   real	   chances	   of	   making	   it	   through	   the	   whole	   process.	   For	   instance,	   if	   judicial	  
actors	   involved	   in	   the	   selection	   know	   that	   a	   certain	   type	  of	   candidate	  will	   eventually	   be	  
vetoed	   by	   political	   actors,	   they	   may	   eliminate	   a	   candidate	   themselves.	   By	   contrast,	   if	  
judges	   manage	   to	   ensure	   that	   only	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   candidate	   makes	   it	   through	   the	  
                                            
21	  For	  a	  somewhat	  similar	  analogy	  see	  Mary	  L.	  Volcansek,	  Appointing	  Judges	  the	  European	  Way,	  34	  FORDHAM	  URB.	  
L.J.	  (2007).	  
22	   E.g.	  Marc	   J.	   Ramseyer	   &	   Eric	   B.	   Rasmusen,	  Why	   Are	   Japanese	   Judges	   so	   Conservative	   in	   Politically	   Charged	  
Cases?,	  95	  THE	  AMERICAN	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  REVIEW	  331	  (2001).	  
23	   On	   the	   bureaucratic	   nature	   of	   judicial	   careers	   in	   some	   judicial	   systems	   see	   for	   instance:	   CARLO	   GUARNIERI	   &	  
PATRICIA	  PEDERZOLI,	  THE	  POWER	  OF	  JUDGES	  (2002).	  
24	  E.g.	  Paterson,	  supra	  note	  20.	  
2082 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  19	  No.	  07	  
process,	  they	  may	  effectively	  constrain	  political	  actors’	  formal	  powers.	  Either	  way,	  it	  is	  not	  
only	  important	  who	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  process,	  but	  also	  at	  what	  stage.	  
	  
The	   paper	   proceeds	   as	   follows.	   In	   Part	   B,	   I	   discuss	   judicial	   recruitment	   in	   the	   broader	  
context	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  judicial	  careers	  literature,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  different	  models	  of	  
judicial	  selection	  practices.	  Part	  C	  analyzes	  models	  of	  judicial	  recruitment	  found	  in	  Europe	  
with	  special	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  openness	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  judicial	  recruitment,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  actors	  playing	  a	  central	  role	  in	  these	  processes.	  Four	  models	  are	  identified	  and	  
analyzed	  in	  this	  part,	  with	  a	  specific	  focus	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  process	  and	  the	  gradual	  
decrease	   of	   the	   number	   of	   potential	   candidates	   competing	   for	   the	   position.	   In	   Part	   D,	   I	  
highlight	   the	  need	  to	  address	  not	  only	  how	  these	  processes	  work	   formally,	  but	  also	  how	  
the	  motivations	   and	   incentives	   of	   the	   involved	   actors	   translate	   into	   the	   composition	   of	  
judiciaries	  and	  their	  diversity.	  Part	  E	  concludes.	  
	  
B.	  Judicial	  Recruitment	  in	  a	  Broader	  Perspective	  
	  
The	   way	   in	   which	   judges	   are	   recruited	   is	   often	   perceived	   as	   an	   inherent	   feature	   of	   a	  
particular	   model	   of	   judicial	   careers.	   In	   the	   bureaucratic	   model	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   judges	  
traditionally	  enter	  the	   judicial	  system	  at	  the	   lowest	   level	  at	  a	  very	  young	  age	  and	  remain	  
there	   for	  most	   of	   the	   remainder	   of	   their	   careers.	   In	   the	   professional	  model,	   judges	   are	  
recruited	  after	  a	  relatively	  successful	  career	  in	  other	  legal	  profession,	  hence	  at	  a	  relatively	  
higher	  age.	  Scholarly	  literature	  generally	  seems	  to	  highlight	  differences	  between	  models	  of	  
judicial	   careers	   and	   models	   of	   judicial	   selection.	   In	   this	   paper	   I	   contend	   that	   in	   Europe	  
these	  differences	  seem	  to	  be	  gradually	  vanishing,	  and	  that	  despite	  some	  differences	  there	  
are	  notable	  similarities	  between	  seemingly	  distinct	  processes.	   In	  this	  Part	   I	  first	  present	  a	  
brief	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  focusing	  on	  the	  ideal-­‐types	  of	  judicial	  careers,	  followed	  by	  
an	  overview	  of	  different	  models	  of	  judicial	  recruitment.	  
	  
I.	  Models	  of	  Judicial	  careers	  
 
There	   are	   two	   ideal-­‐types	   of	   judicial	   careers	   described	   by	   the	   scholarly	   literature.	   A	  
bureaucratic	  model	  of	  judicial	  career,25	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘career	  model’,26	  resembles	  a	  
career	  path	  typically	  found	  in	  civil-­‐service,27	  and	  is	  typically	  found	  in	  countries	  with	  civil	  law	  
tradition.	  According	  to	  Guarnieri	  and	  Pederzoli,28	  judges	  in	  this	  model	  are	  usually	  recruited	  
                                            
25	   See	   Guarnieri	   &	   Pederzoli,	   supra	   note	   23;	   or	   Graham	   Gee,	   The	   Persistent	   Politics	   of	   Judicial	   Selection:	   A	  
Comparative	  Analysis,	  in	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  TRANSITION	  121	  (Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr	  ed.,	  2012).	  
26	  Nuno	  Garoupa	  &	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  Hybrid	  Judicial	  Career	  Structures:	  Reputation	  versus	  Legal	  Tradition,	  3	  JOURNAL	  
OF	  LEGAL	  ANALYSIS	  411	  (2011).	  
27	  See	  for	  instance:	  Volcansek,	  supra	  note	  21;	  or	  Guarnieri,	  supra	  note	  5.	  
28	  See	  Guarnieri	  &	  Pederzoli,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  66-­‐67;	  or	  Gee,	  supra	  note	  25.	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directly	   from	   universities,	   without	   much	   emphasis	   on	   their	   previous	   experiences.	  
Consequently,	  to	  ensure	  they	  have	  all	  the	  necessary	  skills,	  they	  are	  trained	  and	  socialized	  
in	  the	  system	  –	  often	  in	  ‘pre-­‐judicial’	  positions	  as	  law	  clerks,	  so-­‐called	  ‘junior	  judges’,29	  or	  
Rechtspflegers.30	  Judges	  in	  bureaucratic	  judiciaries	  enter	  at	  the	  lowest	  rank	  and	  can	  work	  
their	   way	   up	   the	   hierarchy,	   while	   their	   career	   prospects	   are	   dependent	   on	   superior	   or	  
senior	  judges.	  Also,	   judges	  are	  usually	  generalists	  without	  expertise	  in	  any	  particular	  area	  
of	  law,	  enabling	  them	  to	  perform	  satisfactorily	  anywhere	  the	  system	  needs	  them	  to.	  As	  a	  
result,	  judges	  in	  bureaucratic	  judiciaries	  are	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  shaped	  by	  their	  superiors	  or	  
more	   senior	   judges,	   which	   can	   lead	   to	   a	   self-­‐perpetuation	   of	   attitudes,	   beliefs	   and	  
practices	  within	   the	   judiciary,31	  while	   ‘it	   also	   helps	   to	   forge	   a	   common	   sense	   of	   identity	  
within	   the	   judiciary.’32	  Additionally,	   the	   fact	   that	   judges’	   career	  prospects	  are	  dependent	  
on	   their	   superiors	  can	   threaten	   their	   internal	   independence	  as	   they	  can	  be	  motivated	   to	  
act	  loyally	  in	  order	  to	  be	  rewarded.	  
	  
In	   common	   law	   judiciaries,	   becoming	   a	   judge	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   career	   choice	   but	   rather	   a	  
‘kind	  of	  crowning	  achievement’33	  achieved	  relatively	   later	   in	  professional	   life	  as	  a	  reward	  
for	  a	  successful	  career	  in	  another	  legal	  profession.	  That	  is	  why	  these	  judiciaries	  are	  labelled	  
as	   recognition	   judiciaries,34	   or	   judiciaries	   with	   a	   professional	  model	   of	   judicial	   careers.35	  
Judges	   in	   this	   system	   are	   thereofre	   usually	   trained	   and	   socialized	   outside	   of	   the	   judicial	  
system,	  and	  they	  are	  more	  often	  experts	  in	  a	  particular	  legal	  field	  rather	  than	  generalists.	  
Unlike	   in	   a	   bureaucratic	   model,	   in	   recognition	   judiciaries	   judges	   do	   cannot	   reasonably	  
expect	  to	  be	  promoted	  by	  their	  superiors,	  but	  their	  career	  prospects	  are	  rather	  dependent	  
on	   political	   support.	   This	   makes	   them	   in	   theory	   more	   vulnerable	   to	   external	   pressures;	  
which	  are	  counterbalanced	  through	  other	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  life	  tenure.36	  
                                            
29	  By	   junior	   judges	   I	  mean,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  analysis,	  positions	  found	  for	   instance	   in	  Czechia	  or	  Slovakia,	  
which	  refer	  to	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  apprenticeship	  during	  which	  junior	  judges	  spend	  some	  time	  in	  a	  different	  division	  
of	  the	  judicial	  system	  in	  order	  to	  become	  familiar	  with	  its	  inner	  workings.	  See	  for	  instance,	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  13,	  
at	  189,	  who	  refers	  to	  them	  as	  ‘judicial	  candidates’,	  however	  it	  may	  be	  confusing	  to	  use	  this	  term	  in	  this	  context.	  
30	  Court	  officials	  with	  certain	  judicial	  powers	  in	  German	  speaking	  countries	  or	  countries	  influenced	  by	  the	  German	  
legal	  culture.	  For	  instance,	  CEPEJ	  reports,	  supra	  note	  7,	  use	  this	  term	  as	  well.	  
31	  See	  for	  instance:	  Michal	  Bobek,	  The	  Fortress	  of	  Judicial	  Independence	  and	  the	  Mental	  Transition	  of	  the	  Central	  
European	  Judiciaries,	  14	  EUROPEAN	  PUBLIC	  LAW	  99	  (2008).	  
32	  Gee,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  124.	  
33	   JOHN	  H.	  MERRYMAN,	   THE	   CIVIL	   LAW	  TRADITION:	  AN	   INTRODUCTION	   TO	   THE	   LEGAL	   SYSTEM	  OF	  WESTERN	   EUROPE	   AND	   LATIN	  
AMERICA	  34	  (Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  
34	  E.g.:	  Garoupa	  &	  Ginsburg,	  supra	  note	  26.	  
35	  Guarnieri	  &	  Pederzoli,	  supra	  note	  23;	  and	  Gee,	  supra	  note	  25.	  
36	   John	   Ferejohn,	   Independent	   Judges,	   Dependent	   Judiciary:	   Explaining	   Judicial	   Independence,	   72	   SOUTHERN	  
CALIFORNIA	  L.R.	  353	  (1998).	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Theory	  suggests	  that	  bureaucratic	  judges	  should	  be	  recruited	  through	  competitive	  process,	  
whereas	   vacancies	   in	   recognition	   judiciaries	   are	   filled	   through	   executive	   appointments,	  
where	   candidate’s	   past	   achievements	   help	   a	   selector	   to	   justify	   their	   recruitment	   to	   the	  
public.	  Yet,	  this	  distinction	  has	  only	  limited	  applicability	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  as	  both	  models	  
often	   coexist	   along	   each	   other.37	   According	   to	   Garoupa	   and	   Ginsburg,	   the	   choice	   of	   a	  
model	  of	  judicial	  careers	  is	  determined	  rather	  by	  importance	  of	  reputation	  for	  a	  particular	  
position,	  and	  not	  by	  a	  legal	  tradition	  dominant	  in	  any	  given	  jurisdiction.38	  Consequently,	  we	  
can	  observe	   trends	   that	   are	   contradictory	   to	   expectations	   raised	  by	   the	   two	   ideal-­‐types.	  
The	   lateral	   entry	   becomes	  more	   common	   for	   traditionally	   bureaucratic	   judiciaries	   as	   an	  
attempt	  to	  prevent	  corporatist	  tendencies,	  such	  as	  reserved	  positions	  for	  judges	  socialized	  
outside	   of	   the	   judiciary	   as	   it	   is	   in	   France	   or	   Spain.39	   An	   opposite	   trend	   can	   be	   found	   in	  
common	   law	   countries	   where	   judicial	   recruitment	   has	   traditionally	   been	   executive	  
prerogative,	   but	   judges	   have	   become	   increasingly	   involved	   in	   the	   process	   of	   judicial	  
recruitment;40	   and	   even	  promotions	   are	   not	   that	   uncommon,	   as	   e.g.	  majority	   of	   current	  
Justices	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States	  previously	  served	  on	  lower	  courts.41	  
	  
II.	  Differentiating	  between	  models	  of	  judicial	  recruitment	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  several	  models	  of	  judicial	  recruitment	  can	  occur	  in	  a	  single	  judiciary	  makes	  it	  
particularly	   difficult	   to	   propose	   a	   sufficiently	   complex	   typology	   of	   different	   recruitment	  
procedures.	  Even	  if	  we	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  an	  inquiry	  only	  to	  EU	  countries	  we	  can	  see	  a	  
great	   variance.	   Indeed,	   several	   such	   attempts	   can	   be	   found.	   Volcansek	   focuses	   on	   the	  
process	   through	  which	   judges	   are	   recruited,	   and	   differentiates	   between	   the	   civil	   service	  
model	  of	  judicial	  recruitment,	  shared	  appointment	  and	  shared	  appointment	  with	  partisan	  
quotas.42	  In	  their	  bi-­‐annual	  analysis	  of	  European	  judicial	  systems,	  the	  CEPEJ	  focuses	  on	  four	  
                                            
37	  A	  similar	  point	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Bell,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  17.	  
38	   Garoupa	   &	   Ginsburg,	   supra	   note	   26;	   or	   NUNO	   GAROUPA	   &	   TOM	   GINSBURG,	   JUDICIAL	   REPUTATION:	   A	   COMPARATIVE	  
THEORY	  (2015).	  
39	  Guarnieri,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  171.	  See	  also	  discussion	  throughout	  Part	  C.	  
40	   See	   Van	   Zyl	   Smit,	   supra	   note	   1;	   or	   Jan	   van	   Zyl	   Smit,	   ‘Opening	   up’	   Commonwealth	   Judicial	   Appointments	   to	  
Diversity?	  The	  Growing	  Role	  of	   Judicial	  Commissions,	   in	  DEBATING	   JUDICIAL	  APPOINTMENTS	   IN	  AN	  AGE	  OF	  DIVERSITY	  70	  
(Graham	  Gee	  &	  Erika	  Rackley	  eds.,	  2017).	  Also,	  the	  statement	  that	  81%	  of	  Commonwealth	  countries	  have	  some	  
kind	   of	   Commission	   playing	   a	  role	   in	   the	   selection	   of	   judges	   can	   be	   found	   in:	   Graham	   Gee	   &	   Erika	   Rackley,	  
Introduction:	   Diversity	   and	   the	   JAC’s	   First	   Decade,	   in	   DEBATING	   JUDICIAL	   APPOINTMENTS	   IN	   AN	   AGE	   OF	   DIVERSITY	   1	  
(Graham	  Gee	  &	  Erika	  Rackley	  eds.,	  2017).	  
41	  See	   for	   instance:	  Denise	  Lu,	  Alicia	  Parlapiano	  &	  Karen	  Yourish,	  Kavanaugh	  Followed	  the	  Narrow,	  Elite	  Path	  of	  
Supreme	  Court	  Justices	  in	  NEW	  YORK	  TIMES,	  10	  July	  2018,	  available	  at:	  https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/	  
07/10/us/politics/supreme-­‐court-­‐path-­‐kavanaugh.html.	  
42	  See	  Volcansek,	  supra	  note	  21.	   It	  needs	  to	  be	  noted	  that	   in	  her	  analysis	  Volcansek	  does	  not	  separate	  ordinary	  
judiciaries	  from	  apex	  and/or	  constitutional	  courts.	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factors:	  decisive	  authorities	   in	  the	  process,	   the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  compulsory	   initial	  
training	   for	   judges,	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   process,	   and	   whether	   there	   is	   an	  
established	  procedure	  for	  other	   legal	  professionals.43	  Oberto	  highlights	  actors	  deciding	   in	  
the	   process,	   differentiating	   between	   executive	   nominations,	   recruitment	   through	   public	  
elections,	   co-­‐option	   by	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   through	   the	   committee-­‐centered	   competitive	  
process	   with	   the	   involvement	   of	   judges	   or	   academics.44	   Finally,	   Garoupa	   and	   Ginsburg	  
focus	   on	   the	   role	   of	   judicial	   councils	   in	   the	   process	   of	   recruiting	   judges.45	   In	   addition,	  
specifically	   for	  common	   law	  countries,	  MacNeill	   identifies	   three	  distinct	  models	  which	  all	  
share	  nominations	  by	   the	  executive,	  but	  differ	  as	   regards	   the	  body	  empowered	  to	  select	  
judges	   who	   are	   eventually	   appointed.	   According	   to	   this	   typology,	   this	   power	   can	   be	  
exercised	  by	  the	  executive	  itself,	  it	  may	  require	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  legislature,	  or	  it	  can	  be	  
decided	  by	  an	  independent	  judicial	  screening	  commission.46	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen,	  there	  are	  different	  factors	  that	  can	  be	  highlighted	  when	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  
process	  of	  judicial	  recruitment.	  When	  focusing	  on	  actors,	  Oberto’s	  typology	  perhaps	  covers	  
all	  known	  possibilities	  from	  a	  decisive	  say	  of	  the	  political	  branches,	  through	  involvement	  of	  
the	   judiciary	  –	  by	   itself	  or	   through	  a	  specialized	  committee,	   to	  the	  selection	  of	   judges	  by	  
the	  public.	  There	  are	  still	  several	  nuances	  that	  can	  be	  added.	  Oberto	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  
the	   executive	   among	   political	   branches,	   but	   there	   were	   examples	   when	   the	   power	   of	  
selecting	  new	   judges	  has	  belonged	  to	   the	  parliament.	   In	  Slovenia,	   the	  National	  Assembly	  
makes	  the	  final	  call	  upon	  the	  nomination	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Council.	  In	  Slovakia,	  until	  2002,	  it	  
was	   also	   the	   parliament	   that	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   appointment	   of	   new	   judges.	  
Importantly,	  in	  Czechia,	  although	  ministers	  hold	  formal	  powers	  over	  judicial	  appointments,	  
it	   is	  court	  presidents	  who	  are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  crucial	  gatekeepers.47	  Consequently,	   it	   is	  
formally	   a	   system	  with	   executive	   appointments,	   but	   in	   fact,	   it	  more	   resembles	   a	   system	  
where	  new	   judges	  are	  co-­‐opted	  by	   the	   judiciary.	   Furthermore,	  even	  when	   the	  process	   is	  
governed	  by	  judges,	  the	  co-­‐optation	  can	  happen	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.48	  In	  France,	  Spain	  or	  
Portugal	  it	  is	  judicial	  schools	  which	  effectively	  control	  who	  gets	  the	  opportunity	  to	  have	  the	  
training	  necessary	  to	  hold	  judicial	  office.	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  Slovakia	  or	  Poland,	  the	  role	  of	  
gatekeeper	   is	   practically	   vested	   in	   judicial	   councils.	   Elsewhere,	   e.g.	   in	   Ireland,	   although	  
                                            
43	  See	  for	  instance:	  CEPEJ,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  81-­‐112.	  
44	  See	  GIACOMO	  OBERTO,	  RECRUTEMENT	  ET	  FORMATION	  DES	  MAGISTRATS	  EN	  EUROPE.	  ETUDE	  COMPARATIVE	  13	  (2003)	  as	  cited	  in	  
Bell,	  supra	  note	  5.	  
45	  Garoupa	  &	  Ginsburg,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  119-­‐120.	  
46	   See	   for	   instance	   the	   case	   of	   Ireland	   in	   JENNIFER	   CARROLL	  MACNEILL,	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   JUDICIAL	   SELECTION	   IN	   IRELAND	  
(2016);	   or	   Patrick	  O’Brien,	  Never	   Let	   a	   Crisis	  Go	   to	  Waste:	   Politics,	   Personality	   and	   Judicial	   Self-­‐Government	   in	  
Ireland	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
47	  E.g.	  Adam	  Blisa,	  Tereza	  Papoušková	  &	  Marína	  Urbániková,	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  in	  Czechia:	  Europe’s	  Black	  
Sheep?	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
48	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  Part	  C.	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judges	   formally	   have	   a	   substantial	   say	   in	   the	   process,	   the	   final	   decision	   is	   left	   to	   the	  
executive.49	  	  
	  
There	   are	   several	   reasons	  why	  we	   should	   pay	   attention	   to	   the	   processes	   through	  which	  
judges	   are	   recruited.	   First,	   following	   the	   logic	   found	   in	   international	   recommendations,	  
selection	  of	  a	  particular	  candidate	  can	  create	  certain	  ties	  between	  involved	  parties,	  hence	  
threaten	   the	   judicial	   independence.	  Knowing	  whether	   it	   is	   the	  executive,	  a	   judicial	  body,	  
their	   combination,	  or	   any	  other	  body	   can	  help	  us	   identify	   any	  potential	   threats.	   Second,	  
compulsory	  training	  and	  socialization	  in	  the	  judiciary	  can	  ensure	  imprinting	  values,	  beliefs,	  
attitudes,	   and	   practices	   on	   new	   judges.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	   can	   secure	   the	   effective	  
transfer	  of	  knowledge	  from	  senior	  to	  junior	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary;	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  can	  
prevent	  judiciaries	  from	  any	  new	  ideas	  and	  can	  protect	  the	  survival	  of	  habits	  not	  conducive	  
to	   efficient	   and	   accountable	   justice	   systems.	   All	   in	   all,	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   judges	   are	  
recruited	  can	  have	  numerous	  implications	  on	  the	  actual	  performance	  of	  judicial	  systems.	  
	  
C.	  Structure	  of	  the	  process	  of	  judicial	  recruitment	  
	  
How	  strong	  particular	   actors	   are	   in	   the	   recruitment	  process	   is	  not	   simply	  determined	  by	  
their	   involvement	   in	   the	  process,	   but	   also	  by	   the	   stage	  of	   the	  process	   in	  which	   they	   are	  
involved.	   Despite	   many	   differences	   between	   models	   of	   judicial	   recruitment,	   they	   also	  
share	   certain	   features.	   First	   and	   foremost,	   in	   the	   end,	   the	   process	   needs	   to	   separate	  
winners	  and	  losers	  –	  those	  who	  are	  selected	  and	  appointed	  to	  the	  judicial	  office,	  and	  those	  
who	   are	   not,	   despite	   their	   interest.	   Every	   recruitment	   process	   involves	   a	   number	   of	  
potential	  candidates	  that	  gradually	  decreases	  –	  through	  their	  interaction	  with	  the	  selector	  
–	   until	   only	   one	   (or	   possibly	   few)	   remain	   and	   are	   eventually	   appointed.	   In	   essence,	   the	  
process	  operates	  as	  a	  funnel,	  as	  once	  it	  starts	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  only	  reduces,	  and	  
no	  one	  can	  enter	  the	  process	  from	  the	  outside.50	  This	  analogy	  aims	  to	  help	  us	  identify	  and	  
better	   understand	   critical	   junctions	   in	   the	   recruitment	   process	   where	   selector’s	  
preferences	   determine	   who	   remains	   in	   the	   competition	   for	   the	   judicial	   position,	   and	  
similarly	  importantly,	  who	  is	  eliminated.	  
	  
I	   propose	  dividing	   the	  process	  of	   recruitment	   into	   five	  different	   stages.	   First,	   in	  order	   to	  
become	  a	   judge,	  one	  must	  meet	   the	  prescribed	  criteria	   to	  hold	   such	  an	  office,	  hence	  be	  
eligible	  for	  a	  given	  position.	  Second,	  candidates	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  position	  by	  a	  
selector,	  they	  need	  to	  ‘get	  on	  the	  radar,’	  to	  be	  given	  a	  chance	  to	  compete	  for	  the	  position.	  
Third,	   candidates	   need	   to	   meet	   certain	   criteria	   –	   both	   formal	   and	   informal	   –	   to	   be	  
                                            
49	  See	  particularly	  Part	  C.III.	  
50	  A	  similar	  analogy	  was	  previously	  used	  by	  Volcansek,	  supra	  note	  21,	  at	  364.	  Volcansek	  identified	  three	  stages	  of	  
the	   process:	   a)	   certification,	   which	   ‘derives	   a	   person’s	   status	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   political	   opportunity,	   his	  
opportunity	   costs,	  and	  political	   socialization;’	  b)	   selection,	   in	  which	  candidates	  and	   the	   selecting	  body	   interact;	  
and	  c)	  role	  assignment,	  which	  gives	  legitimacy	  when	  a	  candidate	  formally	  assumes	  the	  office.	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shortlisted	  for	  the	  position	  by	  the	  selector.	  Only	  afterward	  does	  a	  selector	  make	  the	  final	  
call	  and	  selects	  the	  best	  fit	  candidate	  for	  the	  judicial	  office.	  Finally,	  this	  person	  eventually	  
assumes	  the	  office	  through	  a	  formal	  process	  of	  appointment.	  Indeed,	  not	  always	  are	  these	  
stages	   easily	   distinguishable,	   and	   at	   times	   they	   even	   blend,	   but	   generally	   in	   order	   to	  
become	  a	  judge,	  one	  must	  ‘survive’	  all	  these	  critical	  junctions.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   following	   sections,	   I	   identify	   and	   discuss	   these	   stages	   in	   four	   models	   of	   judicial	  
recruitment	  found	  in	  Europe.	  These	  models	  were	  identified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  factors.	  The	  
first	  is	  the	  formal	  openness	  of	  competition,	  i.e.	  dependency	  of	  the	  participation	  of	  any	  one	  
candidate	   on	   the	   will	   of	   the	   selector.	   Czechia	   and	   Slovenia	   serve	   as	   examples	   for	   the	  
‘closed’	  model	   of	   recruitment,	   as	   in	   these	   countries	   judges	   are	   picked	   seemingly	   ‘out	   of	  
thin	  air’	  by	  court	  presidents,	  and	  only	  afterwards	  they	  need	  to	  complete	  a	  formal	  process	  
culminating	  in	  a	  successful	  appointment.	  Among	  open	  and	  competitive	  models	  I	  identified	  
three	  distinct	  paths	  to	  the	   judiciary	  that	  can	  be	  found	   in	  more	  than	  one	  country.	  France,	  
Spain	   and	   Romania	   serve	   here	   as	   examples	   for	   the	  model	   with	   a	   crucial	   role	   played	   by	  
judicial	   schools.	   In	   the	   second	  model,	   central	   role	   is	   played	   by	   judicial	   councils	   –	   along	  
other	  judicial	  self-­‐government	  bodies.	  Such	  a	  model	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Slovakia,	  Poland	  and	  
the	  Netherlands.	  The	   third	  model	   includes	  a	   specialized	  body	  empowered	   to	  select	  most	  
suitable	  candidates,	  e.g.	  those	  found	  in	  Ireland	  or	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Indeed,	  these	  four	  
models	   certainly	   do	   not	   exhaust	   the	   variations	   found	   in	   Europe,	   yet	   they	   show	   that	  
commonly	  found	  models	  of	  judicial	  recruitment	  share	  certain	  similar	  features.51	  It	  needs	  to	  
be	  noted,	  I	  focus	  only	  on	  primary	  paths	  to	  the	  judiciary,	  hence	  the	  most	  common	  ways	  of	  
becoming	  a	   judge.	  As	  was	  discussed	  above,	   it	   is	   not	  uncommon	   to	   find	   several	   different	  
recruitment	   models	   within	   one	   judicial	   system.	   Possibilities	   for	   lateral	   entry	   will	   be	  
therefore	  discussed	  rather	  as	  a	  complement	  to	  the	  typical	  ways	  in	  which	  judges	  in	  different	  





                                            
51	  For	  instance,	  Germany	  offers	  a	  completely	  different	  model	  where	  the	  crucial	  moment	  separating	  those	  who	  can	  
eventually	   become	   judges	   and	   those	   who	   cannot	   takes	   place	   at	   state	   exams	   at	   the	   end	   of	   law	   graduates‘	  
university	   studies.	   See	   Fabian	   Wittreck,	   Judicial	   Self-­‐Government	   in	   Germany:	   Resistance	   and	   the	   Roots	   of	  
Counter-­‐Resistance	   (in	   this	   special	   issue);	   Johannes	   Riedel,	   Recruitment,	   Professional	   Evaluation	   and	   Career	   of	  
Judges	  and	  Prosecutors	  in	  Germany,	  in	  RECRUITMENT,	  PROFESSIONAL	  EVALUATION	  AND	  CAREER	  OF	  JUDGES	  AND	  PROSECUTORS	  
IN	  EUROPE	  69	  (Giuseppe	  Di	  Federico	  ed.,	  2005);	  or	  Bell,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  108-­‐173.	  
52	  For	   instance,	   in	  France	  there	  are	  numerous	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  may	  enter	  the	  judiciary.	  See	  Roger	  Errera,	  The	  
Recruitment,	  Training,	  Career	  and	  Accountability	  of	  Members	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  in	  France	  in	  Di	  Federico,	  supra	  note	  
4	  at	  49-­‐50;	  Bell,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  52-­‐53.	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I.	  Entering	  the	  judiciary	  through	  judicial	  schools	  
	  
	  
A	  prototype	  of	  a	  system	  of	  recruitment	  of	  judges	  through	  judicial	  schools	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
France,	  where	  the	  École	  nationale	  de	  la	  magistrature	  (ENM)	  was	  founded	  more	  than	  half	  a	  
century	   ago.53	   It	   is	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   judicial	   profession	   is	   unique	   and	   requires	  
specific	   training.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   by	   preparing	   judges	   for	   their	   role	   in	   a	   particular	  
environment	  it	  ensures	  the	  transfer	  of	  beliefs,	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  that	  help	  to	  build	  a	  
certain	  common	   identity.54	  The	  typical	   judicial	  career	   in	  this	  model	  starts	  practically	  right	  
after	  the	  graduation	  when	  candidates	  pass	  a	  difficult	  competitive	  examination	  in	  order	  to	  
complete	   a	   thorough	   education	   at	   the	   judicial	   school.	   Only	   afterward	   they	   can	   be	  
appointed	  to	  a	  judicial	  position.	  
	  
Eligibility	   criteria	   in	   this	   model	   are	   usually	   rather	   minimal.	   Candidates	   must	   hold	   a	  
university	  degree,55	  be	  of	  a	  certain	  age	  and	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  other	  formal	  criteria,	  such	  as	  
holding	  a	  particular	  nationality,	  having	  a	  good	  moral	  character,	  and	  being	  physically	  able	  to	  
work	  as	  a	  judge.	  Anyone	  meeting	  these	  prescribed	  criteria	  who	  aspires	  to	  work	  as	  a	  judge	  
can	  apply	  and	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  position.	  To	  be	  accepted	  in	  the	  program,	  candidates	  
                                            
53	  Antoine	  Vauchez,	  The	  Ever	  Protracted	  Rise	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  in	  France	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
54	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  51-­‐52.	  
55	   To	   apply	   to	   the	  French	   judicial	   school,	   ENM,	   candidates	   need	   to	   have	   any	  4-­‐year	   university	   degree	   in	   any	  
subject,	  not	  necessarily	  a	  law	  degree.	  See	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  45.	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need	   to	   pass	   a	   difficult	   nation-­‐wide	   examination	   aimed	   at	   thoroughly	   testing	   their	  
knowledge	  and	  capabilities.	  The	  examination	  consists	  of	  written	  and	  oral	  parts.	   In	  Spain56	  
and	   Romania,57	   candidates	   need	   to	   pass	   a	   test;	   in	   France,58	   the	   written	   part	   includes	  
drafting	   papers	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   legal	   topics	   covering	   different	   branches	   of	   law.	   Oral	  
examinations	   are	   also	   used	   differently	   among	   the	   analyzed	   countries.	   In	   Spain,	   the	  
emphasis	   is	  placed	  on	  hard	  knowledge,	  and	  candidates	  are	  expected	  to	  “sing”	  or	  “recite”	  
their	   answers.59	   Consequently,	   such	   an	   examination	   raises	   a	   concern	   that	   the	  procedure	  
does	   not	   favor	   those	   who	   are	   intellectually	   or	   analytically	   best	   fit	   for	   the	   position,	   but	  
rather	  candidates	  who	  excel	  at	  memorizing.60	   In	  France	  and	   in	  Romania	   the	  oral	  exam	   is	  
designed	   to	   address	   candidates’	   motivations,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   moral	   fitness	   to	   serve	   as	  
judges.	  	  
	  
Differences	  can	  be	  also	  found	  between	  bodies	  deciding	  in	  the	  process	  of	  admission	  to	  the	  
school.	   Whereas	   in	   France	   it	   is	   decided	   by	   the	   Board	   of	   the	   ENM,	   dominated	   by	   the	  
judges,61	  in	  Romania62	  and	  Spain63	  this	  task	  is	  conducted	  by	  a	  special	  admissions	  board	  or	  
by	  tribunals,	  respectively,	  both	  controlled	  by	  their	  respective	  judicial	  councils	  consisting	  of	  
judicial	   members	   with	   representation	   from	   academia,	   law	   practitioners,	   court	   staff	   or	  
representatives	  of	  the	  trainees	  at	  the	  school.	  Passing	  the	  examination	  is	  a	  difficult	  task.	  In	  
France,	   it	  was	   reported	   that	  only	  about	  10%	  of	   candidates	  manage	   to	  be	   successful.64	   In	  
Spain	  only	  about	  5%	  of	  applicants	  are	  eventually	  selected	  as	   the	  preparation	  takes	  up	  to	  
four	   years	   and	   is	   extremely	   demanding.65	   Training	   at	   the	   judicial	   schools	   also	   differs	  
between	  the	  countries.	   In	  Spain,	  candidates	  must	  undergo	  a	  6-­‐month	  training	  concerned	  
                                            
56	  Maria	  Poblet	  &	  Pompeu	  Casanovas,	  Recruitment,	  Professional	  Evaluation	  and	  Career	  of	  Judges	  and	  Prosecutors	  
in	   Spain	   in	   Johannes	   Riedel,	   Recruitment,	   Professional	   Evaluation	   and	   Career	   of	   Judges	   and	   Prosecutors	   in	  
Germany,	  in	  RECRUITMENT,	  PROFESSIONAL	  EVALUATION	  AND	  CAREER	  OF	  JUDGES	  AND	  PROSECUTORS	  IN	  EUROPE	  193	  (Giuseppe	  
Di	  Federico	  ed.,	  2005).	  
57	  Ramona	  Coman	  &	  Cristina	  Dallara,	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Romania,	  in	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  TRANSITION	  835,	  
848	  (Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr	  ed.,	  2012).	  
58	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  48.	  
59	  Poblet	  &	  Casanovas,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  193.	  
60	   Aida	   Torres	   Pérez,	   Judicial	   self-­‐government	   and	   judicial	   independence:	   the	   political	   capture	   of	   the	   General	  
Council	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  in	  Spain	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
61	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  52.	  
62	  See	  Bianca	  Selejan-­‐Gutan,	  Romania:	  Perils	  of	  a	  ‘Perfect	  Euro-­‐Model’	  of	  Judicial	  Council	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
63	  Poblet	  &	  Casanovas,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  194.	  
64	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  45.	  
65	  Poblet	  &	  Casanovas,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  194.	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with	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  skills,	   followed	  by	  a	   training	  period	  working	  at	  a	  court.66	   In	  
France,	   candidates	   for	   judicial	   offices	   go	   through	   complex	   training	   consisting	  not	  only	  of	  
courses	   and	   seminars	   at	   the	   school	   and	   1-­‐year	   internships	   at	   the	   courts	   but	   also	   of	  
internships	  with	  non-­‐judicial	   institutions	  and	  barristers.	   In	  Romania,	  candidates	  must	  first	  
complete	  a	  2-­‐year	  complex	  training	  at	  the	  school	  before	  being	  appointed	  by	  the	  Romanian	  
judicial	   council	   for	   a	   6-­‐year	   training	   period	   to	   work	   as	   ‘junior	   judges’	   or	   ‘junior	  
prosecutors’.	  
	  
Even	   the	   successful	   completion	   of	   all	   mandatory	   training	   does	   not	   secure	   a	   judicial	  
position.	  French	  as	  well	  as	  Romanian	   judges	  first	  need	  to	  pass	  another	  examination	  that,	  
together	   with	   their	   evaluations	   from	   their	   internships	   or	   probationary	   periods,	  
respectively,	  determine	  their	  final	  ranking.	   In	  France,	  this	  examination	  is	  controlled	  by	  an	  
independent	   panel	   appointed	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Justice,67	   and	   only	   few	   fail	   to	   pass	   it.68	  
Afterward,	  successful	  candidates	  are	  nominated	  by	  the	  French	  judicial	  council,	  first	  for	  a	  4-­‐
month	  probationary	  period	  at	  a	  different	  court	  in	  order	  to	  be	  eventually	  appointed	  by	  the	  
president	  of	  the	  country	  to	  the	  judicial	  office.	  In	  Romania,	  the	  judicial	  council	  also	  plays	  a	  
role,	   as	   it	   nominates,	   in	   a	   non-­‐discretionary	   process,	   candidates	   for	   appointment	   by	   the	  
president.69	   In	   Spain,	   the	   appointment	   powers	   are	   vested	   to	   the	   Plenary	   of	   the	   Council,	  
which	   is	   argued	   to	   pose	   a	   risk	   of	   arbitrary	   decision-­‐making	   based	   on	   ideological	  
considerations	  rather	  than	  candidates’	  abilities.70	  
	  
There	  seems	  to	  be	  several	  regularities	  in	  the	  model	  of	  judicial	  recruitment	  through	  judicial	  
schools.	   First,	   the	  most	   important	   step	   for	   a	   candidate	   is	   to	   successfully	   pass	   the	   entry	  
examination	   to	   the	   judicial	   school,	   hence	   move	   from	   being	   actively	   considered	   to	   a	  
shortlist	  of	  candidates	  actually	  lucky	  enough	  to	  obtain	  the	  necessary	  training.	  Second,	  even	  
though	  the	  model	  has	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  selection	  based	  on	  candidates’	  capacity	  and	  
merit,	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   process	   which	   is	   difficult,	   time-­‐consuming	   and	   with	  
uncertain	  results	  may	  favor	  candidates	  with	  certain	  socio-­‐economic	  characteristics	  and	  not	  
necessarily	  those	  best	  equipped	  to	  work	  as	   judges.	   Interestingly,	   in	  all	  three	  jurisdictions,	  
the	  majority	  of	   judges	  are	  women,71	  who	  may	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  endure	  this	  uncertainty	  
because	   of	   their	   stronger	   preference	   for	   work-­‐life	   balance	   eventually	   offered	   by	   the	  
                                            
66	  Torres-­‐Pérez,	  supra	  note	  60.	  
67	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  53.	  
68	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  54,	  Table	  2-­‐4.	  
69	  Coman	  &	  Dallara,	  supra	  note	  57,	  at	  850.	  
70	  Torres-­‐Pérez,	  supra	  note	  60.	  
71	  As	  of	  2014,	  the	  share	  of	  women	  in	  the	  judiciary	  in	  Romania	  was	  at	  74%,	  in	  France	  62%	  and	  in	  Spain	  52%.	  See	  
CEPEJ,	  supra	  note	  7.	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judicial	   position.72	   In	   addition,	   in	   France	   the	   process	   led	   to	   an	   over-­‐representation	   of	  
middle-­‐class	   candidates,73	   at	   times	   with	   family	   ties	   in	   the	   judiciary.74	   Third,	   although	  
judicial	   councils	  do	  not	  play	  central	   roles	   in	   these	  processes,	   they	  exercise	  at	   least	   some	  
control	   over	   who	   enters	   the	   judiciary.	   And	   finally,	   as	   the	   extensive	   education	   and	  
socialization	   among	   judges	   provide	   a	   fertile	   ground	   for	   the	   rise	   of	   corporatist	   attitudes,	  
they	  are	  sometimes	  counter-­‐balanced	  by	  promoting	  paths	   for	   lateral	  entry	   to	  other	   legal	  
professionals.75	   In	   Spain,	   about	  25%	  of	  magistrate	   seats	  are	   reserved	   for	   lawyers	  with	  at	  
least	  10	  years	  of	  experience;76	  in	  France	  the	  education	  at	  the	  ENM	  is	  open	  to	  civil	  servants,	  
those	  who	  served	  as	  elected	  members	  of	  local	  councils,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  with	  a	  doctorate	  in	  
law	  or	  research	  and	  teaching	  experience	  at	  the	  university.77	  
	  
II.	  Recruitment	  controlled	  by	  judicial	  self-­‐government	  bodies	  
	  
The	  model	  of	  judicial	  recruitment	  where	  the	  crucial	  role	  is	  played	  by	  bodies	  of	  judicial	  self-­‐
government	  often	   shares	   similarities	  with	   the	  model	  with	   the	   central	   role	  of	   the	   judicial	  
school.	  Often	  these	  procedures	  are	  competitive,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  Slovakia	  or	  the	  Netherlands;	  
often	  they	  come	  with	  mandatory	  training	  at	  a	  specific	   institution,	  as	   it	   is	   in	  Poland	  or	  the	  
Netherlands.	  Though,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  noted,	  the	  access	  to	  mandatory	  training	  is	  controlled	  
not	   by	   judicial	   schools	   nor	   any	   national	   authority,	   but	   rather	   to	   judicial	   self-­‐government	  
bodies	  on	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  courts.	  In	  addition,	  decisions	  made	  at	  a	  non-­‐national	  level	  
are	  later	  reviewed	  by	  judicial	  councils	  which	  effectively	  serve	  as	  crucial	  gatekeepers.	  
	  
In	  the	  three	  countries	  analyzed	  in	  this	  section,	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  slightly	  differ.	  Slovakia	  
has	   the	   simplest	   rules.	   Candidates	   for	   judicial	   office	   need	   to	   be	   30	   years	   old,	  meet	   the	  
usual	  criteria	  such	  as	  nationality	  and	  clear	  police	  records,	  need	  to	  have	  a	   law	  degree	  and	  
have	  passed	  an	  exam	  authorizing	  them	  to	  exercise	  the	   legal	  profession.78	  Poland	  and	  the	  
                                            
72	  E.g.	  Madlena	  Duarte,	  Paula	  Fernando,	  Conceiçãcao	  Gomes	  &	  Ana	  Oliveira,	  The	  Feminization	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  in	  
Portugal:	  Dilemmas	  and	  Paradoxes,	  10	  UTRECHT	  LAW	  REVIEW	  29	  (2014).	  
73	  For	  France	  see	  Doris	  Marie	  Provine	  &	  Antoine	  Garapon,	  The	  Selection	  of	  Judges	  in	  France:	  Searching	  for	  a	  New	  
Legitimacy,	   in	  Malleson	  &	   Russell,	   supra	   note	   5.	   For	   Spain	   see	   for	   instance:	   Bell,	   supra	   note	   5,	   at	   190,	  where	  
candidates	   from	   less	   prosperous	   regions	   with	   fewer	   professional	   opportunities	   were	   also	   particularly	   over-­‐
represented.	  
74	  Bell,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  53.	  
75	   In	   France,	   entering	   the	   judiciary	   right	   after	   university	   remains	   the	  most	   common	   path,	   however	   there	   have	  
been	   efforts	   to	   promote	   alternative	   paths.	   See	   Antoine	   Garapon	   &	   Harold	   Epineuse,	   Judicial	   Independence	   in	  
France,	  in	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  TRANSITION	  273,	  281	  (Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr	  ed.,	  2012).	  
76	  Poblet	  &	  Casanovas,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  195.	  
77	  Errera,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  47-­‐48.	  
78	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  judicial	  selection	  procedure,	  judicial,	  advocate’s,	  prosecutor’s	  or	  notary	  
exam	  all	  count	  as	  equal.	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Netherlands	  adds	  to	  the	  criteria	  the	  requirement	  related	  to	  previous	  professional	  training.	  
Polish	  judges	  need	  to	  be	  at	  least	  29	  years	  old,	  have	  a	  law	  degree,	  plus,	  they	  need	  to	  have	  
completed	  a	  traineeship	  at	  the	  judicial	  school	  and/or	  served	  as	  probationary	  judges	  for	  at	  
least	  3	  years.	  Recruitment	  from	  the	  positions	  of	  probationary	  judges	  has	  recently	  been	  the	  
most	   common	   path	   to	   judicial	   office.79	   In	   the	   Netherlands,	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   a	   judge’s	  
career	   very	   much	   resembles	   careers	   in	   systems	   with	   judicial	   schools.	   After	   graduation,	  
candidates	  apply	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  ‘judicial	  public	  servant	  in	  training’,80	  they	  need	  to	  pass	  a	  test	  
on	  intelligence,	  a	  psychological	  examination	  and	  an	  oral	  exam	  with	  the	  National	  Selection	  
Committee,	   which	   consists	   of	   22	   members	   appointed	   by	   the	   Dutch	   judicial	   council.81	  
Reports	   suggest	   the	   process	   may	   be	   skewed	   in	   favor	   of	   candidates	   with	   particular	  
characteristics,	  as	  minority	  candidates	  have	  greater	  problems	  to	  pass	  the	  written	  exams.82	  
Candidates	  who	  manage	  to	  pass	  need	  then	  to	  complete	  a	  6-­‐year	  training	  consisting	  of	  38	  
months	  of	  training	  at	  the	  court,	  10	  months	  of	  in-­‐depth	  education	  at	  the	  Training	  and	  Study	  
Center	  for	  the	  Judiciary	  (SSR),	  followed	  by	  a	  2-­‐year	  internship	  outside	  of	  the	  judiciary.83	  
	  
To	  be	  considered	  for	  a	   judicial	  position,	  candidates	  need	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  process.	   In	  both	  
Poland	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   judges	   apply	   directly	   to	   the	   court	   where	   there	   is	   a	   vacant	  
position.	   In	   Poland,	   the	   court	   president	   administering	   applications	   passes	   them	   to	   the	  
college	   of	   the	   court	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	   their	   qualifications.	   Subsequently,	   the	   list	   of	  
candidates	   is	   considered	   by	   the	   assembly	   of	   the	   court,	   which	   takes	   a	   vote	   and	   hence	  
creates	  a	  shortlist	  of	  possible	  candidates.	   In	   the	  Netherlands,	  candidates	  are	   interviewed	  
by	  judges	  of	  the	  court	  to	  determine	  whether	  candidates	  fit	  in	  the	  organization.84	  After	  that,	  
the	  management	  of	  the	  court,	  possibly	  with	  advice	  from	  the	  court’s	  assembly,	  prepares	  a	  
ranked	  list	  of	  3	  candidates	  for	  appointment,	  which	  is	  sent	  to	  the	  judicial	  council.	  	  
	  
In	  Slovakia,	  until	  2017,	  candidates	  similarly	  applied	  directly	  to	  courts.	  As	  this	  practice	  was	  
on	   the	   one	   hand	   rather	   slow,	   leaving	   courts	   with	   vacant	   positions	   for	   a	   considerable	  
amount	  of	  time,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  produced	  results	  that	  favored	  candidates	  who	  previously	  
served	  at	  particular	   courts,85	   these	   rules	  were	  changed.	  Since	   then,	   selection	  procedures	  
                                            
79	   See	   Anna	   Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	   The	   Rise	   and	   Fall	   of	   Judicial	   Self-­‐Governement	   in	   Poland:	   On	   Judicial	   Reform	  
Reversing	  Transition	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
80	   Philip	   M.	   Langbroek,	   Recruitment,	   Professional	   Evaluation	   and	   Career	   of	   Judges	   and	   Prosecutors	   in	   the	  
Netherlands	  in	  Di	  Federico,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  164.	  
81	  See	  Elaine	  Mak,	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  in	  the	  Netherlands:	  Demarcating	  Autonomy	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
82	  Roel	  De	  Lange,	   Judicial	   Independence	   in	  the	  Netherlands,	   in	   JUDICIAL	   INDEPENDENCE	   IN	  TRANSITION	  231,	  243	  (Anja	  
Seibert-­‐Fohr	  ed.,	  2012).	  
83	  Langbroek,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  168.	  
84	  Id.	  at	  168.	  
85	   SAMUEL	   SPÁČ,	   BY	   THE	   JUDGES,	   FOR	   THE	   JUDGES:	   THE	   STUDY	   OF	   JUDICIAL	   SELECTION	   IN	   SLOVAKIA	   (Dissertation	   Thesis,	  
Comenius	  University,	  2017).	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are	   administered	   at	   the	   level	   of	   second-­‐instance	   courts,	   are	   held	   once	   a	   year,	   and	   are	  
intended	  to	  fill	  all	  expected	  vacancies	  in	  the	  region.86	  Five-­‐member	  committees	  appointed	  
by	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Slovak	  judicial	  council	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  selection.	  They	  consist	  of	  
two	  members	  nominated	  by	  the	  judicial	  council,	  two	  members	  nominated	  by	  the	  Minister	  
of	  Justice,	  and	  one	  member	  elected	  by	  the	  college	  of	  presidents	  of	  councils	  of	  judges	  in	  the	  
given	   region.	   The	   procedure	   consists	   of	   a	   series	   of	   written	   exercises,	   psychological	  
evaluation	  and	  the	  interview	  with	  the	  committee,	  which	  decides	  about	  its	  content.	  In	  order	  
to	  pass	  all	   the	  requirements,	  candidates	  need	  to	  score	  at	   least	  60%	   in	  each	  phase	  of	   the	  
process.	  The	  final	  ranking	  of	  the	  candidates	  is	  then	  created	  by	  totaling	  the	  grades	  from	  all	  
phases	  of	  the	  procedure.87	  
	  
In	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   these	   processes	   in	   all	   three	   countries,	   successful	   candidates	   are	  
considered	   by	   judicial	   councils,	   which	   nominate	   them	   for	   appointment	   to	   the	   executive	  
branch.	  The	  Dutch	  council	   receives	  a	   ranked	   list	  of	   three	  candidates	  and	  passes	   it	   to	   the	  
government	   which	   appoints	   the	   highest	   ranked	   candidate.	   In	   Poland	   and	   Slovakia,	  
although	   councils	   interfere	   with	   the	   nomination	   process	   rather	   rarely,	   there	   have	   been	  
some	  controversies.88	  In	  addition,	  both	  the	  Polish	  and	  the	  Slovak	  council	  consider	  security	  
screenings	   prepared	   by	   the	   executive	   branch	   checking	   for	   candidates’	   ‘immaculate	  
character.’89	  The	  appointment	  process	   in	  both	  countries	  has	   seen	  some	  controversies.	   In	  
2014,	   Slovak	   President	   Andrej	   Kiska	   initially	   refused	   to	   appoint	   a	   candidate	   because	   of	  
concerns	   about	   the	   fairness	   of	   the	   selection	   procedure	   and	   asked	   the	   council	   to	  
reconsider.	  Yet,	  when	  the	  council	  nominated	  the	  candidate	  again,	  Kiska	  appointed	  her	  to	  
office.90	  Unlike	   in	  Slovakia,	  Polish	  presidents	  have	  managed	  to	  refuse	  the	  appointment	  of	  
nominated	  judges	  despite	  the	  will	  of	  the	  council.	  In	  2008,	  President	  Lech	  Kaczynski	  refused	  
to	   appoint	   10	   judges	  without	   any	   justification;91	   and	   the	   same	   happened	   in	   2016	  when	  
President	  Andrzej	  Duda	  refused	  to	  appoint	  another	  10	  candidates.92	  As	  neither	  council	  can	  
actually	  overrule	  president’s	  decision,	  the	  observed	  difference	  cannot	  be	  easily	  explained	  
by	  different	  institutional	  setting	  and	  is	  rather	  a	  consequence	  of	  different	  factors.	  
                                            
86	  There	  are	  eight	  regional	  courts	  in	  Slovakia.	  In	  each	  of	  the	  regions	  there	  are	  five	  to	  eight	  district	  courts.	  
87	  For	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  all	  phases	  see	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  85,	  at	  92-­‐94.	  
88	  For	  more	  see	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  Kariérny	  postup	  na	  vyššie	  súdy:	  pod	  kontrolou	  predsedov	  súdov,	   in	  NEDOTKNUTEĽNÍ?	  
POLITIKA	   SUDCOVSKÝCH	   KARIÉR	  NA	   SLOVENSKU	  V	   ROKOCH	  1993-­‐2015	  121	   (Erik	   Láštic	  &	  Samuel	   Spáč	  eds.,	   2017);	  Adam	  
Bodnar	  &	  Lukasz	  Bojarski,	   Judicial	   Independence	   in	  Poland,	   in	   JUDICIAL	   INDEPENDENCE	   IN	  TRANSITION	  667,	  686	   (Anja	  
Seibert-­‐Fohr	  ed.,	  2012).	  
89	  For	  more	  see	  Erik	  Láštic	  and	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  Slovakia	  /	  Slovaquie	  in	  26	  EUROPEAN	  REVIEW	  OF	  PUBLIC	  LAW	  1201	  (2014);	  
or	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  Katarína	  Šipulová	  &	  Marína	  Urbániková,	  Capturing	  the	  Judiciary	  from	  Inside:	  The	  Story	  of	  Judicial	  
Self-­‐Government	  in	  Slovakia	  (in	  this	  special	  issue);	  and	  Bodnar	  &	  Bojarski,	  supra	  note	  88,	  at	  679-­‐680.	  
90	  For	  more	  see	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  85,	  at	  94.	  
91	  For	  more	  see	  Bodnar	  &	  Bojarski,	  supra	  note	  88,	  at	  687,	  690-­‐693;	  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,	  supra	  note	  79.	  
92	  See	  Sledzinska-­‐Simon,	  supra	  note	  79.	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The	   systems	  of	   judicial	   recruitment	   analyzed	   in	   this	   section	   share	   several	   features.	  Most	  
importantly,	   the	   process	   of	   selection	   involves	   three	   actors.	   First,	   there	   is	   a	   selection	  
procedure	  at	  a	  non-­‐national	  level,	  either	  at	  individual	  courts	  or	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  as	  it	  is	  
in	   Slovakia.	   Second,	   a	   shortlist	   of	   successful	   candidates	   is	   passed	   to	   the	   judicial	   council,	  
which	   rarely	   interfere.	   Finally,	   the	   appointment	   rests	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   executive	  
intervening	   in	   the	   process	   only	   sporadically,	   leaving	   the	  major	   responsibility	   at	   the	   non-­‐
national	   level.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   even	   though	   all	   analyzed	   systems	   offer	   possibilities	   of	  
lateral	   entry,	   they	   seem	   to	  be	   rather	  marginal.	   In	  Poland,	   it	  was	  estimated	   that	  only	  15-­‐
20%	  of	  new	  judges	  come	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  judiciary,93	  and	  judicial	  recruitment	  practices	  
in	  Slovakia	  also	  showed	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  candidates	  socialized	  in	  the	  system.94	  	  
	  
III.	  Recruitment	  of	  judges	  through	  specialized	  bodies	  
	  
The	  introduction	  of	  specialized	  bodies	  empowered	  to	  recruit	  judges	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
and	  Ireland	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  indicators	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  judicial	  self-­‐governance	  in	  
Europe	   and	   around	   the	  world.	   Ireland	   created	   its	   Judicial	   Appointments	   Advisory	   Board	  
(JAAB)	   in	   1995.	   It	   consists	   of	   11	   members,	   six	   of	   whom	   are	   judges,	   securing	   a	   narrow	  
judicial	  majority	  in	  the	  body.95	  The	  UK’s	  Judicial	  Appointments	  Commission	  (JAC)96	  started	  
functioning	  a	  decade	  later,	  in	  2006.	  It	  consists	  of	  15	  members	  of	  whom	  only	  six	  are	  judges,	  
and	  only	  eight	  all	   together	  are	   lawyers.	  Additionally,	  not	  only	  are	   judges	   in	   the	  minority,	  
the	  JAC	  is	  chaired	  by	  one	  of	   its	   lay	  members.	   Importantly,	  despite	  seeming	  similarity,	  the	  
two	  bodies	  serve	  considerably	  different	   roles,	  which	  may	  be	   traced	  to	   rationales	  of	   their	  
respective	   establishments.	   The	   Irish	   JAAB	  was	   ‘not	   a	   product	   of	   policy	   preferences,	   but	  
rather	  a	  reaction	  to	  political	  crisis’97	  spurred	  by	  a	  political	  disagreement	  over	  appointments	  
of	  two	  senior	  judges	  causing	  the	  reform	  to	  fail	  to	  diminish	  political	  control	  over	  the	  process	  
of	  judicial	  recruitment.	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  executive	  gave	  up	  its	  powers	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  genuine	  
                                            
93	  See	  Sledzinska-­‐Simon,	  supra	  note	  79.	  
94	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  85.	  
95	  For	  composition	  see	  MacNeill,	  supra	  note	  46.	  
96	  When	   refering	   only	   to	   the	   Judicial	   Appointments	   Commission	   responsible	   for	   appointments	   in	   England	   and	  
Wales,	   I	  purposefuly	   omit	   the	   Northern	   Ireland	   Judicial	   Appointments	   Commission	   (NIJAC)	   and	   the	   Judicial	  
Appointments	  Board	   for	  Scotland	   (JABS)	   that	   fulfill	   the	  same	  task	   in	  other	  parts	  of	   the	  UK.	  Also,	   it	  needs	   to	  be	  
noted	   that	   the	   JAC	   is	   responsible	   only	   for	   appointments	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   and	   High	   Court,	   while	   the	  
appointments	  to	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  happen	  in	  a	  different	  regime.	  See	  van	  Zyl	  Smit,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  206-­‐207.	  
97	  MacNeill,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  88.	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belief	  that	  weakening	  of	  the	  political	   influence98	  would	  help	  to	   improve	  the	   judiciary	  and	  
increase	  diversity	  of	  the	  judicial	  bench.99	  
	  
The	   introduction	   of	   specialized	   bodies	   fundamentally	   altered	   the	   process	   of	   judicial	  
recruitment	   in	   both	   countries.	   Judges	   in	   the	  UK	  were	   in	   the	   past	   selected	   through	   such	  
nontransparent	  procedures	   that	   even	   the	  persons	  being	   considered	   for	   judicial	   positions	  
did	  not	  know	  they	  were	  being	  talked	  about.100	  Currently,	  to	  get	  on	  selector’s	  radar	  in	  the	  
UK,	  candidates	  need	  to	  apply	  and	  demonstrate	  their	   interests	   in	  working	   in	  the	   judiciary.	  
As	  both	  countries	  are	  still	  recognition	  judiciaries,	  eligibility	  criteria	  are	  considerably	  higher	  
than	  in	  continental	  Europe.	  Candidates	  in	  Ireland	  must	  be	  practicing	  lawyers	  for	  at	  least	  10	  
years,101	  in	  the	  UK	  it	  is	  required	  to	  have	  at	  least	  5	  or	  7	  years	  of	  professional	  experience	  in	  
the	  legal	  field.102	  	  
	  
After	   the	   application	   the	   crucial	   stages	   of	   the	   recruitment	   process	   are	   administered	   by	  
these	   specialized	  bodies,	  however	   their	   respective	   roles	  differ.	  While	   in	   Ireland	   the	   JAAB	  
only	   prepares	   a	   shortlist	   of	   candidates	   and	   the	   actual	   selection	   rests	   in	   the	   hands	   of	  
political	   actors,	   the	   JAC	  operating	   in	  England	  and	  Wales	   is	   in	   fact	   responsible	   for	  picking	  
those	  who	   are	   appointed.	   The	   Irish	   JAAB	   assesses	   candidates’	   general	   suitability	   on	   the	  
basis	  of	  their	  applications,	   including	   information	  regarding	  their	  education,	  qualifications,	  
and	  professional	  experiences.	  It	  then	  presents	  a	  list	  of	  the	  seven	  candidates	  it	  perceives	  to	  
be	  fit	  for	  the	  office	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice.	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  body	  played	  a	  rather	  passive	  
role,	   serving	  more	   as	   a	   screening	   body	   than	   a	   genuine	   gatekeeper,	   presenting	   not	   only	  
seven	  candidates	  but	  all	  those	  who	  were	  not	  deemed	  ‘suitable.’103	  Recently	  the	  body	  has	  
started	   to	  play	  a	  more	   substantive	   role,	   recommending	   fewer	   candidates	   for	   the	   judicial	  
office,104	  or	  even	  none,	  as	  was	  reported	  to	  have	  happened	  on	  one	  occasion	  in	  2016.105	  In	  
the	   UK,	   after	   the	   application	   the	   JAC	   sifts	   candidates	   based	   of	   their	   provided	   self-­‐
assessments,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  two	  reference	  letters	  focusing	  on	  their	  professional,	  personal	  or	  
judicial	  qualifications.	  For	  larger	  selection	  procedures,	  candidates	  may	  also	  need	  to	  take	  a	  
                                            
98	   Although	   the	   process	   was	   perceived	   as	   de-­‐politicized	   and	   merit-­‐based,	   political	   considerations	   seemed	   to	  
matter.	  See	  Chris	  Hanretty,	  The	  Appointment	  of	  Judges	  By	  Ministers:	  Political	  Preferment	  in	  England,	  1880-­‐2005	  in	  
3	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LAW	  AND	  COURTS	  305	  (2015).	  
99	  See	  van	  Zyl	  Smit,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  14.	  
100	  For	  more	  on	  these	  practices	  see	  van	  Zyl	  Smit,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  13.	  
101	  For	  more	  information	  see	  https://aji.ie/the-­‐judiciary/appointment-­‐to-­‐judicial-­‐office/.	  
102	  For	  more	  information	  see	  https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/eligibility-­‐legally-­‐qualified-­‐candidates.	  
103	  MacNeill,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  89,	  127-­‐128.	  
104	  MacNeill,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  98.	  
105	  See	  O’Brien,	  supra	  note	  46.	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qualifying	  test	  and	  have	  a	  telephone	  interview.	  Those	  who	  successfully	  get	  ‘shortlisted’	  are	  
invited	   for	   a	   ‘Selection	   Day’	   consisting	   of	   an	   interview	   with	   a	   3-­‐member	   committee	  
examining	  the	  candidates’	  performance	  in	  hypothetical	  scenarios	  or	  role	  plays.106	  
	  
The	   selection	   of	   judges	   in	   the	   UK	   from	   the	   shortlist	   of	   candidates	   is	   determined	   in	  
consultation	   with	   the	   person	  who	   previously	   held	   the	   vacant	   position	   or	   with	   someone	  
who	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  ‘other	  relevant	  experience’.107	  Final	  decisions	  are	  made	  by	  the	  
Selection	  and	  Character	  Committee,	  which	  consists	  of	  JAC	  members	  who	  take	  into	  account	  
all	   the	   accumulated	   assessments	   before	   selecting	   one	   candidate	   for	   each	   vacancy.	  
Interestingly,	   since	   2013,	   in	   case	   of	   a	   tie	   between	   two	   or	   more	   candidates	   in	   terms	   of	  
merit,	  the	  JAC	  should	  select	  a	  candidate	  to	  enhance	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  judicial	  bench.	  108	  
In	   Ireland,	   the	   final	   selection	   does	   not	   happen	   in	   the	   specialized	   body,	   but	   as	  
aforementioned	   it	   is	   the	  Minister	  who,	   after	   a	  discussion	  with	   the	  Attorney	  General	   and	  
the	   Prime	   Minister	   (Taoiseach),	   presents	   the	   selected	   name	   to	   the	   Cabinet	   for	   formal	  
approval.	  Although	  the	  government	  is	  not	  obliged	  to	  select	  any	  candidate	  from	  the	  list,	   it	  
usually	   does	   so.	  When	   in	   1998	   the	   government	  wanted	   to	   appoint	   a	   candidate	   that	   the	  
JAAB	  deemed	  unsuitable,	  members	  of	  the	  JAAB	  threatened	  to	  resign,	  effectively	  protecting	  
the	  significance	  of	  the	  body	  in	  the	  process	  of	  recruiting	  judges.109	  The	  appointment	  rests	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  political	  bodies	  –	  in	  Ireland	  judges	  are	  eventually	  appointed	  by	  the	  President,	  
in	   the	   UK	   by	   the	   Lord	   Chancellor,	   who	   can	   reject	   a	   recommendation	   and	   as	   the	   JAC	   to	  
reconsider,	  but	  must	  provide	  written	  reasons	  for	  such	  action.	  
	  
In	   summary,	   judicial	   recruitment	   through	   specialized	   bodies	   have	   managed	   to	   curtail	  
traditional	   political	   influence	   over	   the	   process	   and	   have	   allowed	   judicial	   actors	   to	  
effectively	   control	   entrance	   to	   the	   judiciary.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   Ireland	   the	  merit	   principle	  
seems	  to	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	   fact	   that	  greater	  chances	  of	  success	   in	   the	  process	  have	  
candidates	   who	   are	   known	   by	   crucial	   decision-­‐makers.110	   In	   addition,	   the	   reformed	  
processes	   have	   so	   far	   failed	   to	   curb	   other	   traditional	   biases	   or	   create	  more	   diverse	   and	  
representative	   benches.	   As	   of	   2014	   only	   about	   30%	   of	   judges	   in	   both	   judiciaries	   were	  
female.111	   Also,	   reports	   confirm	   that	   in	   the	   UK	   the	   same	   applies	   to	   ethnic	   or	   racial	  
                                            
106	   For	   more	   information	   about	   the	   process	   see	   https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/overview-­‐selection-­‐
process.	  
107	  For	  more	  information	  see	  https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/statutory-­‐consultation.	  
108	  For	  more	  see	  https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/equal-­‐merit-­‐provision.	  
109	  O’Brien,	  supra	  note	  46.	  
110	  MacNeill,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  151.	  
111	  CEPEJ,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  101.	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minorities,112	   urging	   some	   scholars	   to	   call	   for	   quotas	   to	   balance	   the	   bias	   favoring	  
candidates	  from	  dominant	  identity	  groups.113	  
	  
IV.	  Recruiting	  judges	  out	  of	  sight	  
	  
In	   Czechia	   and	   Slovenia,	   the	   process	   of	   judicial	   recruitment	   is	  much	   less	   visible	   and	   less	  
structured	  than	  in	  the	  previously	  described	  cases.	  Paradoxically,	  this	  eventually	  serves	  for	  
the	  benefit	  of	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	  bodies,	  because	   it	   is	   court	  presidents	  who	  are	   the	  
most	   crucial	   actors	   in	   the	   process.	   This	   happens	   because	   the	   political	   bodies	   –	   the	  
president	   in	   Czechia	   and	   the	   parliament	   in	   Slovenia	   –	   who	   are	   empowered	   to	   appoint	  
judges	   traditionally	   act	   more	   as	   notaries	   confirming	   decisions	   made	   elsewhere	   than	   as	  
actual	  gatekeepers.	  Consequently,	  as	   crucial	  decisions	  are	  made	  out	  of	   sight,	   to	  obtain	  a	  
proper	  understanding	  of	  these	  recruitment	  processes	   it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  have	  access	  
to	   information	   about	   their	   informal	   parts.	   Otherwise,	   it	   may	   be	   impossible	   to	   identify	  
candidates	   considered	   for	   the	   job,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   recognize	   how	   they	   are	   eventually	  
selected.	  
	  
The	   eligibility	   criteria	   in	   both	   countries	   described	   in	   this	   section	   are	   fairly	   similar.	  
Candidates	  need	  to	  have	  obtained	  a	  law	  degree,	  must	  be	  30	  years	  of	  age	  and	  must	  meet	  
some	   common	   criteria,	   such	   as	   nationality	   or	   ‘good	   character.’	   Slovenian	   judges	  
additionally	  need	  to	  have	  at	  least	  3	  years	  of	  professional	  experience	  in	  law,114	  while	  Czech	  
judges	  need	  to	  have	  passed	  a	  special	   judicial	  exam	  or	  the	  equivalent.115	   	   In	   the	  following	  
stages,	   it	   is	   the	   court	   presidents	   who	   are	   the	  most	   important	   actors.	   In	   Slovenia,	   court	  
presidents	  make	  a	  preliminary	  reasoned	  selection	  of	  candidates,	  which	  they	  submit	  to	  the	  
Judicial	  Council.	  The	  criteria	  that	   judges	  use	  to	  draw	  up	  a	  shortlist	  or	  determine	  who	  the	  
candidates	  are	  seem	  to	  be	  hidden	  from	  the	  public	  eye.116	  Czech	  court	  presidents	  also	  enjoy	  
a	  great	  amount	  of	  discretion	  in	  the	  process.	  There	  are	  no	  national	  criteria	  for	  the	  selection	  
procedures,	  hence	  they	  may	  differ	  from	  one	  court	  to	  another.	  At	  some	  courts	  it	  seems	  that	  
court	   presidents	   hand-­‐pick	   new	   judges,	   elsewhere	   court	   presidents	   have	   opted	   for	  
selection	  procedures	  based	  on	  tests	  conducted	  by	  the	  Judicial	  Academy.117	  	  
	  
                                            
112	  See	  https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2018/07/judicial-­‐diversity-­‐statistics-­‐2018-­‐1.pdf.	  
113	  Malleson,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  281.	  
114	   Cristina	   Dallara,	   Judicial	   Reforms	   in	   Transition:	   Legacies	   of	   the	   past	   and	   dominant	   political	   actors	   in	   post-­‐
communist	  countries,	  1	  IRSIG-­‐CNR	  WORKING	  PAPER	  10	  (2007).	  
115	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  consideration	  for	  a	  judicial	  position,	  candidates	  can	  have	  passed	  exams	  authorizing	  them	  to	  
work	  in	  different	  legal	  professions,	  such	  as	  advocates,	  notaries	  or	  executors.	  
116	  See	  Matej	  Avbelj,	  Contextual	  Analysis	  of	  Judicial	  Governance	  in	  Slovenia	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
117	  Blisa,	  Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  47.	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The	  process	  of	  appointment	  is	  also	  fairly	  similar	  in	  both	  countries.	  In	  Czechia,	  the	  minister	  
formally	  nominates	  candidates	  for	  judicial	  offices	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  government	  but	  does	  so	  
upon	  request	  from	  the	  court	  president.	  Eventually,	  judges	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  president	  
of	   the	   country.	   Slovenian	   judges	   are	   nominated	   for	   their	   offices	   by	   the	   judicial	   council,	  
which	   does	   so	   based	   on	   criteria	   adopted	   together	   with	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice.	  
Appointment	   rests	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   parliament,	   which	   usually	   confirms	   proposed	  
candidates	  without	  any	  substantive	  discussion.	  This	   suggests	   ‘a	  certain	  balance’	  between	  
the	   judicial	   and	   the	   political	   body.118	   Although,	   there	   have	   been	   few	   instances	   reported	  
when	   the	   National	   Assembly	   declined	   to	   appoint	   proposed	   candidates	   despite	   criticism	  
from	   experts	   and	   the	   general	   public,	   in	   at	   least	   one	   of	   these	   cases	   the	   unsuccessful	  
candidate	   had	   served	   as	   an	   attorney,	   and	   hence	   aimed	   to	   enter	   the	   judiciary	   from	   the	  
outside.119	  
	  
In	   summary,	   in	   this	   model	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	   bodies	   seem	   to	   enjoy	   considerable	  
discretion	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   formal	   powers	   belong	   to	   politicians.	   Because	   the	  
recruitment	  process	  happens	   in	   a	   rather	  nontransparent	  way,	   judicial	   bodies	   can	   greatly	  
benefit	   from	   the	   information	   asymmetry	   they	   have	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   political	   bodies.	   The	  model	  
provides	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  favoritism	  and	  selection	  based	  on	  criteria	  other	  than	  merit,	  as	  
court	   presidents	   serve	   as	   de	   facto	   unrestrained	   gatekeepers.	   Whether	   they	   opt	   to	  
concentrate	   such	   powers	   in	   their	   own	   hands,	   or	   whether	   they	   employ	   competitive	  
procedures	  or	  make	  their	  decisions	  in	  consultation	  with	  other	  judges	  of	  the	  court	  is	  largely	  
dependent	   on	   their	   will.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   the	   openness	   of	   the	   judiciary	   to	   legal	  
professionals	  working	   in	  other	   fields.	   In	  both	  countries,	  eligibility	  criteria	  suggest	   there	   is	  
an	   option	   of	   recruiting	   judges	   laterally,	   however	   the	   actual	   openness	   is	   once	   again	  
dependent	   on	   individual	   actors.	   Based	   on	   this,	   it	   can	   be	   reasonably	   hypothesized	   that	  
candidates	   working	   in	   the	   judiciary	   as	   law	   clerks	   or	   ‘junior	   judges’	   may	   have	   greater	  
chances	  of	  being	  appointed,	  hence	  the	  crucial	  moment	   in	   judges’	  careers	  may	  happen	  at	  
earlier	  stages	  of	  their	  careers	  –	  when	  they	  are	  recruited	  for	  junior	  positions,	  or	  when	  they	  
are	   taking	   the	  required	   judicial	  exam.120	  Paradoxically,	   the	  Slovenian	  example	  also	  shows	  
that	  politicians	  may	  at	  times	  protect	  the	  judiciary	  from	  outsiders,	  even	  when	  the	  judiciary	  
itself	  proposes	  such	  a	  candidate.	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  Cristina	  Dallara,	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   Judicial	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DEMOCRACY	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  (Cristina	  
Dallara	  ed.,	  2014).	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  Dallara,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  38-­‐39;	  Avbelj,	  supra	  note	  116.	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  For	  more	  on	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  and	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  to	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  judges	  in	  the	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  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  13,	  
at	  189.	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D.	  Analyzing	  judicial	  recruitment:	  taking	  actors	  and	  their	  motivations	  into	  account	  
	  
The	  discussion	   in	  the	  previous	  Part	  showed	  that	  different	  systems	  tend	  to	  favor	  different	  
candidates.	  While	  the	  recruitment	  through	  judicial	  schools	  leads	  to	  over-­‐representation	  of	  
women	  and	  middle-­‐class	  candidates,	  models	  where	  a	  crucial	  role	  is	  played	  by	  judicial	  self-­‐
government	   bodies	   at	   non-­‐national	   level	   tend	   to	   favor	   those	   with	   ties	   in	   the	   given	  
environment.	   Traditional	   recognition	   judiciaries	   have,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   suffered	   from	  
being	   elitist	   and	   unrepresentative	   of	   their	   societies.	   The	   particular	   composition	   of	   the	  
judicial	   bench	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   interplay	   between	  motivations	   of	   selectors	   (who	  
they	   search	   for),	   and	   candidates	   (who	   seek	   a	   judicial	   job)	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   specific	  
institutional	  design	  (who	  decides	  in	  what	  stage	  and	  how	  much	  discretion	  they	  enjoy).	  
	  
I	   argued	   that	   judicial	   recruitment	   operates	   as	   a	   funnel	  where	   the	   number	   of	   candidates	  
gradually	  decreases	  until	  only	  one	   (or	   few)	  remain	   in	   the	  competition	  and	  are	  eventually	  
appointed	  to	  the	  judicial	  office.	  This	  process	  has	  several	  critical	  junctions	  –	  eligibility,	  active	  
consideration,	   shortlisting,	   selection	   and	   appointment	   –	   which	   effectively	   shape	   the	  
outcome	  of	  the	  judicial	  recruitment	  process.	  Because	  of	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  beyond	  
institutions	   and	   the	   legal	   framework	   and	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   motivations	   of	  
involved	   actors.	   For	   instance,	   if	   eligibility	   criteria	   invite	   candidates	   from	   other	   legal	  
professions,	  yet	  their	  chances	  of	   ‘surviving’	  the	  competition	  would	  be	  considerably	  small,	  
as	  they	  may	  not	  meet	  the	  informal	  criteria	  set	  out	  by	  a	  selector,	  a	  fairly	  small	  number	  of	  
candidates	  for	  lateral	  entry	  may	  be	  misunderstood	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  of	  such	  candidates	  
for	  judicial	  positions.	  Similarly,	  participation	  in	  the	  recruitment	  process	  may	  be	  too	  costly	  
for	   certain	   groups	   of	   candidates	   causing	   over-­‐representation	   of	   particular	   parts	   of	   the	  
society	  on	  the	  judicial	  bench.	  In	  addition,	  even	  if	  the	  process	  of	  recruitment	  was	  a	  perfect	  
rank-­‐order	  tournament	  in	  which	  candidate	  compete	  against	  one	  another,121	  their	  chances	  
may	   be	   skewed	   because	   selection	   criteria	  may	   hold	   latent	   bias	   favoring	   some	   groups	   of	  
candidates	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   others,	   incorrectly	   suggesting	   differences	   between	   them	  
while	  disregarding	  possible	  benefits	  of	  a	  more	  diverse	  judiciary.	  
	  
In	  an	  ideal	  case,	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  merit-­‐principle	  emphasized	  in	  ‘soft	  law’	  standards,	  an	  
output	   of	   the	   recruitment	   process	   should	   be	   a	   result	   of	   a	   ‘concern	   for	   correctly	  
ascertaining	   the	   competence.’122	   In	   general,	   at	   each	   of	   the	   critical	   junctions,	   candidates	  
need	  to	  persuade	  selecting	  bodies	  they	  are	  better	  fit	  than	  their	  competitors	  to	  perform	  the	  
judicial	   function.	  Yet,	  competence	  may	  be	  only	  one	  of	   the	  many	  considerations	  selectors	  
                                            
121	  E.g.	  Hanretty,	  supra	  note	  98;	  Stephen	  Choi	  &	  Mitu	  Gulati,	  A	  Tournament	  of	  Judges?	   In	  92	  CALIFORNIA	  L.R.	  299	  
(2004);	  Jordi	  Blanes	  I.	  Vidal	  &	  Clare	  Leaver,	  Are	  Tenured	  Judges	  Insulated	  from	  Political	  Pressure?	  In	  95	  JOURNAL	  OF	  
PUBLIC	   ECONOMICS	   570	   (2011);	   or	   Martin	   R.	   Schneider,	   Judicial	   Career	   Incentives	   and	   Court	   Performance:	   An	  
Empirical	  Study	  of	  the	  German	  Labour	  Courts,	  20	  EUROPEAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LAW	  AND	  ECONOMICS	  127	  (2005).	  
122	   Karen	   J.	   Alter,	  Agents	   or	   Trustees?	   International	   Courts	   in	   their	   Political	   Context	   in	   14	   EUROPEAN	   JOURNAL	   OF	  
INTERNATIONAL	  RELATIONS	  33,	  42	  (2008).	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make.	   To	   put	   it	   differently,	   selectors	   always	   have	   some	   preferences,	   from	   normatively	  
desirable	  through	  those	  less	  legitimate	  to	  possibly	  latent	  ones.	  Selectors	  may	  pay	  attention	  
to	  candidates’	   ideological	  positioning123	   in	  order	   to	  secure	  certain	  political	   influence	  over	  
the	  courts;124	  or	  they	  can	  pursue	  other	  objectives	  such	  as	  diversity	  and	  representativeness	  
of	  the	  bench,125	  	  particularistic	  interests,126	  or	  partisan	  considerations.127	  
	  
The	   assumption	   that	   selectors	   always	   have	   motivations	   is	   particularly	   important	   for	   a	  
proper	   understanding	   of	   how	   judicial	   recruitment	   works	   in	   the	   age	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐
government.128	  Whether	   recruiting	   powers	   belong	   to	   political	   branches	   or	   the	   judiciary,	  
the	  process	   in	  which	   selectors	   equip	  new	   judges	  with	   considerable	  powers	   establishes	   a	  
certain	   connection	   between	   them.129	   There	   are	   several	   reasons	   why	   the	   danger	   of	  
transferring	   these	  powers	   to	   the	  hands	  of	   judges	   should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	   Judges,	  
just	  like	  any	  other	  group	  of	  actors,	  can	  have	  shared	  interests	  which	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  
the	   composition	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   Indeed,	   they	   are	   not	   inevitably	   harmful	   –	   they	  may	   be	  
based	   on	   reasonable,	   even	   virtuous,	   expectations	   about	   the	   role	   of	   the	   judiciary.	  
Nevertheless,	   there	   is	   a	   substantial	   amount	   of	   evidence	   suggesting	   that	   actors	   within	  
judiciaries	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  as	  dangerous	  as	  political	  actors,	  although	  their	   interests	  may	  
                                            
123	  E.g.	  Hanretty,	  supra	  note	  98;	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Segal	  &	  Harold	  J.	  Spaeth,	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  Attitudinal	  Model	  
Revisited	  (2002).	  
124	   See	   particularly	   ‘government	   control	   regime’	   in	   Rachel	   E.	   Bowen,	   Judicial	   Autonomy	   in	   Central	   America:	   A	  
Typological	  Approach	  in	  66	  POLITICAL	  RESEARCH	  QUARTERLY	  831	  (2013).	  For	  current	  developments	  in	  Central	  Europe	  
see	   Adam	   Bodnar,	   Europe	   can	   save	   Poland	   from	   darkness	   in	   POLITICO,	   9	   April	   2018,	   available	   at:	  
https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-­‐judiciary-­‐rule-­‐of-­‐law-­‐europe-­‐must-­‐intervene/;	   David	   Kosař	   &	   Katarína	  
Šipulová,	  The	  Strasbourg	  Court	  Meets	  Abusive	  Constitutionalism:	  Baka	  v.	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  10	  HAGUE	  
JOURNAL	  ON	  THE	  RULE	  OF	  LAW	  83	  (2018);	  or	  Bojan	  Bugaric	  &	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  The	  Assault	  on	  Postcommunist	  Courts	  in	  
27	  JOURNAL	  OF	  DEMOCRACY	  69	  (2016).	  For	  other	  parts	  of	  world	  see	  Raul	  A.	  Sanchez-­‐Urribarri,	  The	  Politicization	  of	  
Latin	  American	  Judiciary	  via	  Informal	  Connections,	  in	  LEGITIMACY,	  DEVELOPMENT	  AND	  CHANGE:	  LAW	  AND	  MODERNIZATION	  
RECONSIDERED	   307	   (David	   K.	   Linnan,	   ed.,	   2012);	   Fombad,	   supra	   note	   2;	   Alexander	   Stroh,	   Consequences	   of	  
Appointment	   Policies	   for	   Court	   Legitimacy	   in	   Benin:	   A	   Network	   Analysis	   Approach,	   281	   GIGA	   WORKING	   PAPER	  	  
(2016);	  or	  Voeten,	  supra	  note	  3.	  
125	  E.g.	  Malleson,	  supra	  note	  1;	   Jeffrey	  D.	   Jackson,	  Beyond	  Quality:	  First	  Principles	   in	   Judicial	  Selection	  and	  their	  
Application	  to	  a	  Commission-­‐Based	  Selection	  System	  in	  34	  FORDHAM	  URBAN	  L.J.	  125	  (2007).	  
126	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
127	   See	   Simone	   Benvenuti	   &	   David	   Paris,	   Judicial	   Self-­‐Government	   in	   Italy:	  Merits,	   Limits	   and	   the	   Reality	   of	   an	  
Export	   Model	   (in	   this	   special	   issue);	   Başak	   Çalı	   &	   Betül	   Dürmuş,	   Judicial	   Self-­‐Government	   as	   Experimental	  
Constitutional	  Politics:	  The	  Case	  of	  Turkey	  (in	  this	  special	  issue).	  
128	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  12.	  
129	   Such	   relationships	   can	  be	   framed	  within	  Principal-­‐Agent	   theory.	  See	  Voeten,	  supra	  note	  3.	  Although	   for	   the	  
study	  of	  judges	  some	  authors	  recommend	  rather	  the	  idea	  of	  ‚trustees‘	  as	  they	  are	  entrusted	  with	  power	  and	  have	  
freedom	  to	  act	  autonomously	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  principal.	  See	  Alter,	  supra	  note	  122,	  at	  38-­‐44.	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manifest	   in	   different	   ways.130	   Importantly,	   if	   the	   power	   to	   recruit	   judges	   belongs	  
predominantly	   to	   the	   judges	   themselves,	   the	   inherent	   information	   asymmetry	   between	  
them,	   political	   branches	   and	   the	   general	   public,	   may	   easily	   give	   rise	   to	   particularistic	  
interests.	  
	  
Although	   it	   is	   selectors	  who	  shape	   the	  process	   the	  most,	   their	   choices	  are	  bound	  by	   the	  
pool	  of	  candidates	  from	  which	  they	  are	  choosing	  future	  judges.	  To	  reasonably	  identify	  who	  
is	  actually	  interested	  in	  judicial	  positions,	  researchers	  could	  greatly	  benefit	  from	  high	  levels	  
of	   transparency	   that	   would	   allow	   them	   to	   learn	   about	   their	   characteristics	   in	   order	   to	  
properly	   analyze	   them.131	   In	   addition,	   to	   understand	   who	   even	   gets	   to	   the	   pool	   of	  
candidates,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  motivations	  of	  prospective	  judges	  to	  seek	  a	  
judicial	   position.	  Building	  on	  Posner,132	   I	   believe	   that	   in	  order	   for	   an	   individual	   to	   seek	  a	  
judicial	  position,	  the	  utility	  of	  being	  a	  judge	  must	  outweigh	  the	  utility	  of	  working	  in	  another	  
legal	   profession,	   and	   they	  must	   understand	   the	   costs	   of	   participating	   in	   the	   recruitment	  
process	  as	  being	  reasonable	  and	  subjectively	  bearable,	  while	  also	  perceiving	  a	  reasonable	  
chance	  to	  succeed	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  utility	  of	  being	  a	  judge,	  candidates	  consider	  expected	  time	  devoted	  to	  judging,	  
and	  time	  devoted	  to	  other	  activities.	  The	  reasonable	  balance	  between	  the	  two,	  which	  the	  
work	  in	  the	  judiciary	  seems	  to	  offer,	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  female	  judges	  who	  prefer	  
to	   have	   enough	   time	   for	   their	   families	  more	   often	   than	  men.133	   Reputation	   and	   income	  
stemming	   from	   the	   judicial	   position	   may	   be	   among	   other	   factors	   determining	   one’s	  
willingness	  to	  become	  a	  judge.	  Indeed,	  perceived	  and	  expected	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  particular	  
                                            
130	   E.g.	   J.	  Mark	   Ramseyer	  &	   Eric	   B.	   Rasmusen,	   Judicial	   Independence	   in	   a	  Civil	   Law	  Regime:	   The	   Evidence	   from	  
Japan	   in	  13	  THE	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LAW,	  ECONOMICS	  AND	  ORGANIZATION	  259	  (1997);	  Ramseyer	  &	  Rasmusen,	  supra	  note	  22;	  
David	  M.	  O’Brien	  &	  Yasuo	  Ohkoshi,	  Stifling	  Judicial	  Independence	  from	  Within:	  ,	  in	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  THE	  AGE	  
OF	  DEMOCRACY	  37	  (Peter	  H.	  Russell	  &	  David	  M.	  O’Brien	  eds.,	  2001);	  Bobek	  &	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  16;	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  
13;	   Bogdan	   Iancu,	   Perils	   of	   Sloganised	   Constitutional	   Concepts.	   Notably	   that	   of	   ‘Judicial	   Independence’,	   13	  
EUROPEAN	   CONSTITUTIONAL	   L.R.	   582	   (2017);	   Coman	  &	   Dallara,	   supra	   note	   57;	   Lukasz	   Bojarski	   &	  Werner	   Stemker	  
Köster,	  The	  Slovak	  judiciary:	   its	  current	  state	  and	  challenges	   (Open	  Society	  Foundation	  2012);	  Maria	  Popova,	  Be	  
Careful	  What	  You	  Wish	  For:	  A	  Cautionary	  Tale	  of	  Post-­‐Communist	  Judicial	  Empowerment,	  18	  DEMOKRATIZATSIYA	  56	  
(2010);	   Maria	   Popova,	   Why	   Doesn’t	   the	   Bulgarian	   Judiciary	   Prosecute	   Corruption?,	   59	   PROBLEMS	   OF	   POST-­‐
COMMUNISM	   35	   (2012);	   Lydia	   F.	  Müller,	   Judicial	   Administration	   in	   Eastern	   Countries,	   in	   JUDICIAL	   INDEPENDENCE	   IN	  
TRANSITION	  937	  (Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr	  ed.,	  2012).	  
131	   Several	   authors	   studied	   judicial	   selection	   using	   statistical	   analyses,	   e.g.:	   Vidal	   &	   Leaver,	   supra	   note	   121;	  
Hanretty,	  supra	  note	  98;	  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  85.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  employing	  network	  analytcal	  approach,	  for	  an	  
overview	  see	  Björn	  Dressel,	  Raul	  Sanchez-­‐Urribarri	  &	  Alexander	  Stroh,	  The	  Informal	  Dimension	  of	  Judicial	  Politics,	  
13	  ANNUAL	  REVIEW	  OF	  LAW	  AND	  SOCIAL	  SCIENCE	  413	  (2017).	  
132	  Richard	  A.	  Posner,	  What	  Do	  Judges	  and	  Justices	  Maximize?	  (The	  Same	  Thing	  Everybody	  Else	  Does),	  3	  SUPREME	  
COURT	  ECONOMIC	  REVIEW	  1,	  31-­‐39(1993).	  
133	   E.g.	  Duarte	   et	   al.,	   supra	   note	   72;	   or	  Matej	  Uhlík	  &	   Samuel	   Spáč,	  Príčiny	   a	   dôsledky	  nadreprezentácie	   žien	   v	  
slovenskom	  súdnictve,	  in	  NEDOTKNUTEĽNÍ?	  POLITIKA	  SUDCOVSKÝCH	  KARIÉR	  NA	  SLOVENSKU	  V	  ROKOCH	  1993-­‐2015	  (Erik	  Láštic	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job	  would	  probably	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  consideration	  of	  any	  prospective	  candidate,	  as	  well	  as,	  
for	  instance	  a	  feeling	  of	  personal	  contribution	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  society	  or	  even	  the	  idea	  
of	   ‘justice.’	  Although,	  candidates	  may	  not	  only	  by	  motivated	  by	  virtue,	  but	  also	  can	  seek	  
fulfilment	   of	   their	   personal	   interests,	   such	   as	   being	   able	   to	   exert	   influence	   in	   particular	  
cases	   or	   even	   benefiting	   from	   participation	   in	   a	   system	   of	   corruption.134	   As	   regards	   the	  
costs	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  recruitment	  process,	  prospective	  judges	  may	  consider	  the	  time	  
and	   energy	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   a	   reasonable	   chance	   for	   success	   in	   the	   process.	   For	  
instance,	  if	  in	  Spain	  it	  is	  known	  that	  preparation	  for	  entry	  exams	  takes	  couple	  of	  years	  and	  
is	   extremely	   demanding,	   it	   can	   easily	   discourage	   large	   number	   of	   potential	   candidates.	  
Similarly,	  if	  prospective	  judges	  in	  Slovakia	  know	  that	  to	  succeed	  they	  need	  connections	  in	  
the	  judicial	  system,	  it	  may	  prevent	  them	  from	  even	  seeking	  active	  consideration.	  Last	  but	  
not	   least,	   as	   Alemanno	   warns	   with	   regard	   to	   CJEU	   and	   ECtHR,	   the	   transparency	   of	   the	  
process	  may	  pose	  a	   threat	   to	   the	   integrity	  of	   candidates	  who	  might	  be	   subject	   to	  public	  
scrutiny	  and	  can	  actually	  hurt	  their	  reputation.135	  
	  
All	   in	  all,	   the	  recruitment	  process	   is	  not	  a	  perfect	  competition	  where	  only	  the	  best	  fit	   for	  
the	   office	   succeed.	   It	   is	   rather	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	   interplay	   between	  motivations	   and	  
interests	   of	   selectors	   and	   potential	   candidates	   for	   the	   judicial	   office	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	  
particular	   institutional	  design.	  Recruitment	  process	  translates	  into	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  
bench,	  which	  in	  turn	  affects	  how	  the	  judiciary	  is	  performing.	  Taking	  these	  motivations	  into	  
consideration	  hence	  may	  be	   in	  fact	  as	   important	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	   judicial	  recruitment	  
and	   its	   effects	   on	   the	   actual	   performance	   of	   the	   judiciary	   as	   is	   identifying	   crucial	  




The	   rise	  of	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	   is	   clearly	   visible	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   recruitment	  of	  
new	   judges	   in	   Europe.	   This	   can	   be	   stated	   with	   confidence,	   not	   only	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
countries	  analyzed	  in	  this	  paper,	  but	  even	  in	  cases	  that	  were	  omitted	  here.136	  Transferring	  
these	   powers	   into	   the	   hands	   of	   judges	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   cure	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   diseases.	   In	  
Ireland,	  a	  greater	  involvement	  of	  judges	  in	  judicial	  recruitment	  was	  a	  response	  to	  a	  political	  
                                            
134	  E.g.	  Daniel	   J.	  Beers,	  Understanding	  Corruption	   in	  the	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  Attitudinal	  Data	  from	  Romania	  
and	   Czech	   Republic	   (11th	   Annual	   International	   Researchers	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   Causes,	  
Manifestations,	  Consequences	  2012).	  
135	  Alberto	  Alemanno,	  How	  Transparent	  is	  Transparent	  Enough?	  Balancing	  Access	  to	  Information	  Against	  Privacy	  
in	  European	  Judicial	  Selection,	  in	  SELECTING	  EUROPE’S	  JUDGES:	  A	  CRITICAL	  REVIEW	  OF	  THE	  APPOINTMENT	  PROCEDURES	  TO	  THE	  
EUROPEAN	  COURTS	  202	  (Michal	  Bobek	  ed.,	  2015).	  
136	  See	  contributions	  on	  different	  jurisdictions	  in	  this	  issue,	  particularly	  Germany.	  Although	  it	  is	  rarely	  considered	  
an	  example	  of	  strong	  judicial	  self-­‐governance,	  even	  there	  judges	  play	  a	  substantive	  role	  in	  the	  recruitment	  of	  their	  
colleagues:	  see	  Wittreck,	  supra	  note	  51.	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crisis.137	  In	  Slovakia,	  such	  a	  change	  occurred	  due	  to	  the	  unsatisfactory	  performance	  of	  the	  
old	  model	  much	   similar	   to	   that	   found	   currently	   in	   Czechia.138	   In	   the	   UK,	   the	   transfer	   of	  
power	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  genuine	  desire	  for	  a	  better	  model	  supported	  by	  concerns	  
for	   legitimacy,139	   and	   in	  Romania	   it	  was	  a	  part	  of	   larger	   reforms	   towards	  greater	   judicial	  
self-­‐governance.140	   Either	  way,	   judges	   seem	   to	   have	  more	   power	   than	   ever	   in	   recruiting	  
their	  colleagues	  and	  successors.	  
	  
International	   documents	   have	   called	   for	   the	   greater	   involvement	   of	   judges	   as	   a	   tool	   for	  
ensuring	  recruitment	  based	  on	  merit,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  result	  in	  candidates’	   increased	  
capacity	  to	  properly	  perform	  their	  judicial	  functions.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  plan	  seems	  to	  have	  
several	  shortcomings.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  there	  is	  no	  unified	  conception	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  
a	   good	   judge,	   or	  what	  makes	   one	   judge	   better	   than	   another,	   and	   hence	   it	   is	   practically	  
impossible	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  a	  merit-­‐oriented	  process	  delivers	  what	  it	  promises.141	  Even	  
if	   we	   allow	   that	   a	   judicial	   recruitment	   process	   controlled	   by	   judges	   delivers	   the	   best	  
possible	   judges,	   there	   are	   many	   examples	   that	   undermine	   this	   assumption.	   As	   was	  
discussed	   in	   the	  paper,	  merit-­‐oriented	  processes	   tend	  to	   favor	  specific	   identity	  groups	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  others,	  as	  happens	   in	  France,142	  the	  Netherlands143	  and	  the	  UK,144	  or	  they	  
can	  be	  skewed	  towards	  candidates	  with	  stronger	  connections	  to	  the	  judiciary,	  as	  was	  the	  
case	   in	   Slovakia.145	   These	   examples	   suggest	   that	   no	   matter	   how	   the	   process	   of	   judicial	  
recruitment	   is	  designed,	   it	   is	   shaped	  by	   the	  actors	   involved	   in	   it,	   and	   the	  outcome	  –	   the	  
selection	   and	   appointment	   of	   judges	   –	   reflects	   their	   preferences,	   whether	   they	   are	  
virtuous	  or	  driven	  by	  self-­‐interest.	  
	  
This	  is	  why	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  deeper	  study	  of	  how	  judicial	  recruitment	  models	  affect	  the	  
composition	  of	  the	  bench.	  As	  was	  stated	  throughout	  the	  paper,	  judges	  play	  an	  indisputable	  
role	  throughout	  the	  European	  systems	  of	  judicial	  recruitment.	  Although	  attention	  is	  usually	  
paid	  to	  the	  formal	  rules	  and	  bodies,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  actors	  and	  institutions	  interacting	  in	  the	  
process,	   other	   factors	   may	   be	   more	   significant	   for	   our	   deep	   understanding	   of	   the	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  MacNeill,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  38-­‐47,	  88.	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  Spáč,	  supra	  note	  85.	  
139	  E.g.	  Van	  Zyl	  Smit,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
140	  E.g.	  Selejan-­‐Gutan,	  supra	  note	  62;	  or	  Parau,	  supra	  note	  13.	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  Dimino,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  819.	  For	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  quality	  of	   judges	  see	  also:	   JASON	  E.	  WHITEHEAD,	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  VALUES	  AND	  THE	  RULE	  OF	  LAW	  (2014).	  
142	  Provine	  &	  Garapon,	  supra	  note	  73.	  
143	  De	  Lange,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  243.	  
144	  E.g.	  Malleson,	  supra	  note	  1;	  or	  Malleson,	  supra	  note	  7.	  
145	  Spáč,	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  note	  85.	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recruitment	  of	  judges.	  In	  the	  paper,	  I	  proposed	  five	  stages	  in	  which	  candidates	  for	  judicial	  
office	  may	  be	  eliminated	  until	  one	  or	  a	  few	  remain	  and	  are	  eventually	  appointed.	  Potential	  
candidates	  must	  first	  and	  foremost	  be	  willing	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  ambition	  to	  become	  
a	  judge,	  which	  at	  times	  involves	  intensive	  preparation,	  as	  it	  does	  in	  Spain,	  where	  years	  of	  
study	   are	   required,	   as	  well	   as	   possibly	   useful	   connections	   in	   the	   judicial	   system.146	   Then	  
candidates	  need	  to	  meet	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  for	  the	  position,	  get	  on	  the	  selector’s	  radar	  
to	   be	   actively	   considered,	   pass	   the	   selector’s	   requirements	   to	   get	   on	   the	   shortlist,	   and	  
eventually	  be	  selected	  and	  appointed.	  What	  matters	  more	  than	  whether	  judges	  play	  a	  role	  
in	   the	   process,	   or	   through	   which	   body,	   is	   how	   other	   powers	   utilize	   their	   checks	   and	  
balances	  and	  in	  which	  stages	  of	  the	  process.	  Arguably,	  the	  Irish	  JAAB	  enjoys	  considerably	  
less	  control	  over	  who	  becomes	  a	   judge	  than	  the	  Czech	  court	  presidents	  do,	  even	  though	  
the	  formal	  powers	  belong	  to	  the	  Czech	  political	  elites.	  Similarly,	  political	  actors	   in	  the	  UK	  
and	   in	   Slovakia	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   contradict	   decisions	  made	   by	   the	   bodies	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐
governance,	   while	   similarly	   empowered	   political	   actors	   in	   Poland	   and	   in	   Slovenia	   have	  
successfully	   constrained	   the	   discretion	   of	   judicial	   bodies.	   All	   in	   all,	   scholarly	   attention	  
should	  not	  only	  focus	  on	  whether	  judges	  are	  involved	  in	  judicial	  recruitment,	  but	  rather	  at	  
what	  stage	  and	  with	  what	  interests,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  how	  their	  powers	  are	  balanced	  by	  other	  





                                            
146	  Poblet	  &	  Casanovas,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	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